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ABSTRACT 
 
Typical business groups are widely diversified into unrelated industries.  
Scholars have explained this as a consequence of institutional weaknesses and predicted 
that business groups would lose their effectiveness and increasingly refocus as 
institutional environments improve.  
In this dissertation, I suggest a new perspective on business groups by revisiting 
their hybrid nature and focusing on the fact that two different boundaries exist for 
business group member firms.  I differentiate between group-level diversification and 
firm-level diversification and argue that they serve different purposes, which lead to 
divergent patterns of diversification.  
First, at the business group level, I question the appropriateness of applying the 
concept of relatedness to the diversification of a business group.  Emphasizing the 
hybrid nature of the business group, I argue that its purpose of diversification may be 
more to provide the group’s member firms with critical resources than to obtain 
synergies from operating in related industries.  Relying on the insights from the input-
output model, I propose the idea that business groups are more likely to enter industries 
that have linkages to multiple other industries than to follow the relatedness criterion.  I 
test the idea using the data of 30 major South Korean business groups’ diversification 
from 1999 to 2008 and find an empirical support. 
Second, at the member firm level, I focus on the importance of group-level 
characteristics on member firms’ diversification choices.  Emphasizing economic 
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incentives, I propose that the business group structure and relationships within it affect 
its member firms’ strategic orientation and choices in ways that may satisfy the needs of 
both the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  I theorize that the size, the 
degree of diversification, and the proportion of intragroup transaction of a business 
group would affect diversification choices of its member firms.  Based on the data of 
108 public member firms of 30 major South Korean business groups, I find empirical 
support for most of my hypotheses.   
The implication of my dissertation is that the business group may be not just a 
coping mechanism for underdeveloped institutions, but an organizational innovation that 
can work in any institutional environment. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“My father and I started a cosmetic cream factory in the late 1940s.  At the time, 
no company could supply us with plastic caps of adequate quality for cream jars, 
so we had to start a plastics business.  Plastic caps alone were not sufficient to 
run the plastic molding plant, so we added combs, toothbrushes, and soap boxes.  
This plastics business also led us to manufacture electric fan blades and 
telephone cases, which in turn led us to manufacture electrical and electronic 
products and telecommunication equipment.  The plastics business also took us 
into oil refining, which needed a tanker shipping company.  The oil refining 
company alone was paying an insurance premium amounting to more than half 
the total revenue of the then largest insurance company in Korea.  Thus, an 
insurance company was started.  This natural step-by-step evolution through 
related businesses resulted in the Lucky-Goldstar group as we see it today.” 
(Koo Cha-Kyung, former chairman of the LG Group, as quoted in Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992:542-543) 
 
Business Group as a Paradox 
Business groups – collections of legally independent firms that are owned or 
controlled by the same person or persons (Cainelli & Iacobucci, 2011) who are usually 
family members (Chang & Hong, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & shleifer, 1999; 
Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Morck & Yeung, 2003) – seem to defy some of the 
major tenets of strategic management.  Scholars mostly agree that unrelated 
diversification is harmful (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & 
Yiu, 2011), but business groups are typically diversified widely to unrelated industries 
(Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Kock & Guillén, 2001).  Moreover, the presence of the 
controlling shareholders presiding over a wide variety of listed and unlisted member 
firms is believed to be a threat to the ideal of strong corporate governance because the 
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controlling shareholders may destroy value by pursuing their own interest at the expense 
of minority shareholders (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 
2002; Chang, 2003).  Indeed, many studies on business groups focus on their dark side: 
how they can only exist and prosper in environments characterized by poor institutions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b; Leff, 1978) or foreign trade and investment asymmetries 
(Guillén, 2000; Kock & Guillén, 2001); and how controlling shareholders of business 
groups may “tunnel” resources from one member firm to another (Bertrand et al., 2002; 
Chang, 2003; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000) or divert resources 
to prop up weaker, inefficient member firms (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003; Jia, 
Shi, & Wang, 2013) to pursue their own benefits.1 
Given these negative accounts for business groups, their ongoing persistence and 
prevalence around the world even as national economies mature under the strong 
influence of globalization may be called paradoxical (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 
2014).  Despite the prediction that diversified business groups in emerging markets will 
increasingly undertake corporate refocusing (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 
2005), evidence suggests otherwise. For example, business groups in India, one of the 
major emerging markets, became larger and more diversified instead of smaller and 
more focused as the Indian economy liberalized  between 1989 and 2008 (Siegel & 
Choudhury, 2012).   
                                                 
1 Johnson et al. (2000:1) define tunneling in the abstract as “the transfer of assets and profits out of firms 
for the benefit of their controlling shareholders”.  Friedman et al. (2003: 735) describe propping as 
“negative tunneling”.  
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Moreover, even though academic research on business groups tends to focus on 
those in emerging markets, business groups are an important part of many developed 
economies as well (La Porta et al., 1999; Langlois, 2010; Morck et al., 2005).  
According to Morck et al. (2005), a single business group accounts for half the market 
capitalization in Sweden and the largest ten business groups constitute 40% of the 
market capitalization in Canada, while the assets of the largest fifteen business groups 
amount to over 80% of Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP).  The United States 
and the United Kingdom, countries where business groups are not prominent – large 
firms there are mostly held widely and do not control other listed firms due to legal 
constraints and prohibitions2 – are rare exceptions rather than the norm (Granovetter, 
1995; Kandel, Kosenko, Morck, & Yafeh, 2013; Langlois, 2010; Morck et al., 2005).   
Purpose and Approach of the Dissertation 
If business groups are prone to exclusively benefit controlling shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders, why are outside investors still interested in business 
group member firms and why do business groups keep expanding?  If business groups 
are organized to exploit weak institutions, why do business groups continue to be 
relevant in improved and advanced institutional environments?   
This dissertation explores potential reasons for the resilience and success of 
business groups by revisiting their nature as a “hybrid” organizational form (Williamson, 
                                                 
2 For example, in the U.S. the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) prohibits banks from owning stock of industrial 
companies and the Investment Company Act (1940) makes it impossible for a company to manage another 
company without actually own it.  In the U.K., in 1968, the London Stock Exchange started to require that 
anyone acquiring 30 percent of a publicly traded firm should acquire 100 percent of the firm. 
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1991).  Because a business group is a collection of firms, a business group has two 
different boundaries.  Each business group member firm has its own boundary, and the 
member firm is also placed inside another, larger boundary, that of the business group.  
Figure 1 shows a stylized graphical example.  The business group boundary is depicted 
as a dashed line to convey the idea that the business group is rarely a legal entity.  For a 
member firm, the business group represents a special market-like environment in which 
it enjoys relationships and transactions based on trust and shared values (Das & Teng, 
1998; Keister, 1998; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  Therefore, business groups 
have characteristics of firms as well as those of markets. 
This hybrid nature of business groups has not been fully examined because prior 
studies have made approximations in an effort to apply existing theories about the firm – 
such as transaction cost theory, agency theory, and resource-based theory – to the 
business group.  First, most studies of business groups have focused on the level of 
business group member firms by comparing them with stand-alone firms (e.g., Ferris, 
Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2002; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  Even though this approach provides us with a way to 
understand the economic impact of business groups, the approach reduces the complex 
phenomenon of business groups just to a matter of membership.  On the other hand, 
some scholars consider the hierarchy to exist at the group level and regard business 
group member firms as divisions of a conglomerate (e.g., Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Guillén, 2000).  However, this second approach has the danger of ignoring 
or downplaying (1) the autonomy of legally independent group member firms, (2) the 
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ties and transactional relationships among member firms, and (3) the business group’s 
market-like characteristics. 
The basic premise this dissertation puts forth is that the controlling shareholders 
of a business group may not want, and may not have, to exercise blanket control over all 
the member firms.  Indeed, with cognitive and physical limitations, it may not be 
realistic to expect the controlling shareholders to manage a large business group as 
tightly as some prior research works have assumed (e.g., Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2005).  I propose that by designing and controlling the 
overall group structure, the controlling shareholders may be able to help define linkages 
among member firms and give each member firm unique economic incentives to play an 
appropriate role within the business group structure.  The implication is that member 
firms will try to choose and pursue strategies in order to reap the maximum possible 
benefits of group membership.  In turn, if the group is structured in a desirable way, the 
controlling shareholders will benefit without having to get involved in every detail of 
every business.  A recent finding that structures of business groups are formed more as 
the result of sequential delegation of authority than as the consequence of control-
magnifying intention (Belenzon, Patacconi, & Zelner, 2012b) is consistent with this 
view.  Moreover, given the inherent incompleteness of strategic factor markets, building 
an appropriate market-like environment within the boundary of the business group may 
contribute positively to the growth potential of the group’s member firms (Manikandan 
& Ramachandran, 2014). 
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This dissertation specifically focuses on the diversification3 of business groups 
and their member firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994).  Because a business group is 
formed when a specific type of diversification – setting up a separate legal entity instead 
of diversifying the existing firm further – is pursued, the most crucial group-level 
characteristics have to do with the diversification pattern of the business group.  
Business groups are often characterized in the literature as a quintessential example of 
unrelated diversification (Hoskisson et al., 2005; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Kock & 
Guillén, 2001), but in reality, degrees of diversification in business groups do vary and 
how they approach diversification may be different as well.  This dissertation examines 
business group diversification at two different levels: the business group level and the 
member firm level. 
On the business group level, I propose that diversification at this level should not 
be examined solely based on the relatedness criterion (Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974; 
Wan et al., 2011) given the market-like nature of the business group.  Typical business 
groups are widely diversified into unrelated industries, which scholars have explained as 
a consequence of institutional weaknesses (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Kock & Guillén, 
2001).  However, I suggest the possibility that this seemingly non-strategic and 
inefficient diversification pattern may actually be a way for a business group to take 
advantage of the linkages among different industries to provide its member firms with 
                                                 
3 Diversification can refer to both product diversification, “expansion into product markets new to the 
firm” and international diversification, “expanding across country boarders into geographic locations (e.g., 
markets) that are new to the firm” (Hitt et al., 1994: 298).  However, in this dissertation, diversification 
only means product diversification unless otherwise noted. 
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critical resources to spur the member firms’ growth.  Relying on insights from Leontief’s 
(1986) input-output model, I propose that business groups are more likely to enter 
industries that have linkages to multiple other industries than to follow the relatedness 
criterion.  I argue that, given the business group’s market-like nature, the business 
group’s purpose of diversification (provision of critical resources to member firms) 
should differ from the purpose of the firm (creation of synergies from operating in 
related industries).  
On the member firm level, I propose that various characteristics of the business 
group affect a member firm’s diversification choices.  The logic is that group-level 
characteristics imply that each member firm has a unique set of roles and characteristics 
within the business group, and that each member firm will pursue strategic options that 
will maximize the benefits of its membership to the business group.  Therefore, I argue 
that member firms’ diversification patterns will differ depending upon the characteristics 
and diversification pattern of the business group to which the firms belong.  
Additionally, I suggest that for business group member firms, whether they are 
diversifying into an unrelated industry should be determined more carefully than for 
stand-alone firms because business group member firms may be able to realize synergies 
even when they seem to enter an unrelated industry if there is another member firm of 
the same business group in the industry thanks to the special market environment 
characterized by trust and shared values (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014). 
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Empirical Test of the Ideas 
 I test the ideas in this dissertation using a sample of 30 major South Korean 
business groups and their listed non-financial member firms from 1999 to 2008. South 
Korea is an ideal testing ground for the ideas because business groups dominate the 
country’s economy.  Moreover, since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the 
institutional environment of the country has improved immensely.  However, business 
groups have continued to flourish, strengthening their competitive advantage rather than 
withering away from inefficiency.   
Table 1 shows that the top 30 business groups in South Korea collectively 
account for a substantial portion of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In 
2008, the total assets and the total sales of the 30 largest business groups amounted to 
approximately 84 percent and 85 percent of the country’s GDP, respectively.  Even 
though there are changes in the composition of business groups and yearly fluctuations 
in financial details over the decade from 1999 to 2008, the table indicates that major 
business groups continue to take up a significant portion of South Korea’s national 
economy.  Furthermore, as the financial impacts of the Asian financial crisis wear off, 
major South Korean business groups appear to be growing even faster and expanding 
their influence even further. 
Contributions 
 This dissertation makes several contributions to the business group literature and 
the diversification literature. 
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To the literature on business groups 
This dissertation makes several major contributions to the business group 
literature.  First, the dissertation looks inside each business group rather than treating all 
business groups as homogeneous.  Most prior studies of business groups focus primarily 
on the economic efficiency of business group membership, through comparisons of 
group member firms’ performance with that of stand-alone firms (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a, b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012).  Such an approach 
assumes that business groups are homogeneous and that firms benefit or lose from 
membership universally.  I challenge these assumptions by sorting out different 
diversification characteristics of business groups and focusing on each member firm’s 
incentives to take advantage of the business group characteristics, which collectively 
define the special market-like environment in which the member firm operates. 
Second, I provide a new way of thinking about the nature of business group 
diversification by differentiating it from that of firm-level diversification.  Prior studies 
have examined business groups either at the firm level (e.g., Guillén, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004) or at the group level (e.g., 
Chung & Luo, 2008; Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood, Chung, & Mitchell, 2013; 
Mahmood & Lee, 2004; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005) 
assuming that hierarchy exists at just one level.  I argue that group-level diversification 
should be examined as a separate and different (but related) phenomenon from that of 
firm-level diversification because the purpose of the former is different from that of the 
latter.   
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Third, I further suggest there is a linkage between the two forms of 
diversification: a business group’s diversification characteristics may affect its member 
firms’ diversification strategies.  This opens the door for the possibility that setting up a 
certain business group structure may lead to desirable strategic outcomes for member 
firms.  I propose that the business group form may generate economic incentives for 
member firms (both carrots and sticks) by posing structural constraints on member 
firms’ diversification while providing resources on which member firms can draw.   
Prior studies, even when they examine the internal mechanisms of business 
groups, tend to focus simply on how business group member firms can benefit from 
resources available within the group structure (Chang & Hong, 2000; Mahmood, Zhu, & 
Zajac, 2011).  I counterbalance this by considering the fact that incentives for the 
business group member firm arise from structural constraints as well as resource 
endowments.  By highlighting economic incentives within the business group, I suggest 
that the business group as an organizational form should be seen as an organizational 
innovation set up to satisfy the diverse and often conflicting needs of the controlling 
shareholders and other shareholders (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  Thus, I 
argue that the business group should be seen through a positive lens rather than the “dark 
side” perspective that regards the business group as an organizational form that can only 
keep its relevance and advantage by bridging institutional deficiencies and exclusively 
benefits the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. 
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To the literature on diversification 
Additionally, this dissertation also makes contributions to the diversification 
literature.  First, prior research on diversification has mostly focused on the relationship 
between the degree of diversification and financial performance.  Because the focus has 
been primarily on how diversified a firm is, the pattern of its diversification - the 
portfolio of industries in which the firm operates and the choices it makes over time to 
build up the portfolio – has not been highlighted (Lemelin, 1982).  However, from the 
perspective of managers and stakeholders of a firm, it may be more helpful to know 
what industries to enter and how to build an appropriate portfolio of activities than to 
know whether the firm is at the optimum level of diversification.  The relatedness 
criterion may provide managers with enough insight on how to deal with issues 
surrounding diversification.  However, a more complete picture may emerge when 
industry characteristics and interrelationships among different industries are considered 
together with firm characteristics.  This dissertation suggests a way to combine these 
considerations to understand diversification in a different light. 
Second, this dissertation suggests that firms and business groups may have 
different purposes for diversification.  I develop a theory of business group 
diversification based on inter-industry linkages rather than rely on the firm-level theories 
of diversification based on relatedness in order to consider the market-like nature of the 
business groups.  The concept of inter-industry linkages has been emphasized in 
development economics, especially in the theory of unbalanced growth (Hirschman, 
1958; Jones, 1976), but has rarely been used or considered in strategic management 
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research regarding diversification (c.f., Lemelin, 1982; Zhou, 2011).  Combining 
insights that arise from the understanding of industrial linkages with knowledge that 
have been accumulated with the notion of relatedness may form a stronger foundation 
for future diversification research, especially regarding business groups. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the remainder of the 
dissertation.  Chapter II presents a critical review of studies and theories that are relevant 
for this dissertation.  Chapter III examines diversification at the business group level and 
argues that group-level diversification should not be viewed in the same perspective that 
has been used in studies of firm diversification.  This idea is tested empirically based on 
30 South Korean major business groups’ industry portfolio data from 1999 to 2008.  
Chapter IV focuses on business group member firms’ diversification patterns to examine 
how business group characteristics may affect member firms’ diversification choices.  I 
extend the ideas developed in Chapter III to the member firm level to argue that business 
group member firms have incentives to pursue certain directions in their diversification 
choices under the influence of their respective business groups, which have distinct 
characteristics.  I combine the data used in Chapter III with firm-level diversification and 
industry entry data to test the general idea.  Chapter V discusses the overall implication 
of the findings, suggests future research directions, and concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Definition of Business Groups 
No single definition exists for the business group.  Many different forms of 
business groups exist and operate in different countries and institutional contexts 
(Morck, 2010; Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). 
Leff (1978: 663) proposes probably the earliest definition of a business group: “a 
multicompany firm which transacts in different markets but which does so under 
common entrepreneurial and financial control”.  Leff’s definition treats a business group 
like one single integrated firm even though the group member firms are legally 
independent.  Other definitions that downplay the independence of member firms of a 
business group largely follow his perspective on business groups (Chang & Hong, 2000; 
Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004).4 
One of the most widely used academic definitions of business groups is 
Granovetter’s (1995:95): “collections of firms bound together in some formal and/or 
informal ways, characterized by an ‘intermediate’ level of binding”.  Granovetter’s 
definition explicitly recognizes that even though there may be some degree of 
integration among the member firms of a business group, they are basically separate.  
                                                 
4 Chang and Hong (2000: 429) define a business group as “a gathering of formally independent firms 
under the single common administrative and financial control of one family”. Mahmood and Mitchell 
(2004: 1348) define business groups as “conglomerations of nominally independent firms that operate 
under common administrative and financial management and often are controlled by families”.  Their 
definitions largely focus on the role of the business group as a hierarchy, downplaying the legally 
independent nature of business group member firms as simply titular or nominal. 
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Khanna and Yafeh (2007) offer a similar definition, but further clarify the characteristics 
of member firms: “legally independent firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) 
industries, which are bound together by persistent formal (e.g., equity) and informal 
(e.g., family) ties”.  Additionally, Kock and Guillén (2001:78) define business groups as 
“loose constellations of firms spanning a wide variety of manufacturing and service 
industries held together by common ownership or informal control ties.” 
In these definitions that focus on ties among business group member firms rather 
than the hierarchical administrative control, the existence of an entity that controls and 
guides all the member firms is not evident.  To account for that, Colpan and Hikino 
(2010) distinguish network-type business groups, in which no single dominant entity 
exists, from hierarchy-type business groups, where a single entity is supposed to 
dominate strategic decision-making.  Morck (2010) and Guillén (2010) suggest the 
existence of an entity that controls all the member firms as one of the main features of 
diversified business groups.  Indeed, even though Japanese keiretsu may fall into the 
category of network-type business groups, this category has the potential danger of 
encompassing too wide a variety of economic relationships such as regional clusters and 
strategic alliances (Langlois, 2010).   
Among hierarchy-type business groups, family-controlled ones are by far the 
most common and influential across countries (Langlois, 2010; Morck et al., 2005).  
Even though political considerations often support the formation and growth of business 
groups (Schneider, 2009), it is rare to see business groups directly controlled by a 
national government outside of China, where the government has fostered the formation 
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of business groups (Keister, 1998) and used them to control strategic industries vital to 
the national economy (Yiu et al., 2005).  This dissertation focuses on hierarchy-type 
business groups and acknowledges the existence of controlling shareholders, who are 
usually family members.  
Some scholars include even Western-style conglomerates within the conceptual 
boundary of business groups (Altomonte & Rungi, 2012).  However, what really 
characterizes the business group is not control per se but rather the non-financial nature 
of control, which is based on the social solidarity often arising from kinship 
(Granovetter, 1995; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Smångs, 2006).  Including 
Western-style conglomerates in the definition may dilute the importance of this unique 
characteristic.  This dissertation is based on the view that business groups are different 
from conglomerates. 
There are numerous empirical studies of business groups as indicated by the 
number of published and unpublished studies on which a recent meta-analysis on 
business groups was based (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, & van 
Oosterhout, 2011).  However, given the definition of business groups, it appears that too 
much attention has been paid to the member firm level rather than the group itself.  Most 
empirical studies of business groups have been done at the member firm level; this is 
despite the complexity and heterogeneity of business groups arising from the fact that 
they are collections of firms, each of which is already a complex economic and social 
phenomenon.   
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The economic implications of business groups have mostly been examined based 
solely on membership (Carney et al., 2011).  A majority of prior studies of business 
groups examine the performance implications of business group membership at the firm 
level, trying to determine whether business group member firms outperform non-
member firms (e.g., Chang & Choi, 1988; Ferris et al., 2002; Khanna, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a, b).  Scholars have also employed this approach in multi-country studies 
to determine whether weak institutions promote the economic success of business groups 
(e.g., Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).   
However, these research questions make the unlikely assumption that 
membership in any business group has a universal impact irrespective of each business 
group’s unique characteristics and circumstances.  Additionally, this approach ignores 
the possibility that business group member firms may develop characteristics and 
strategies that are different from those of non-member firms, which would make the 
comparison between the two groups difficult, if not impossible (Siegel & Choudhury, 
2012).  Even though it is worthwhile to examine whether business group membership in 
general is positive or negative in terms of member firm performance, it may be arguably 
more important to see how different group-level characteristics may affect different 
member firms’ characteristics and strategies. 
Theoretical Approaches to Business Groups 
Scholars have taken diverse theoretical approaches to study business groups (Yiu 
et al., 2007).  Major theories employed include transaction cost theory (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001), agency theory (Bertrand et al., 2002; Morck & Yeung, 2003), resource-
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based theory (Kock & Guillén, 2001; Tan & Meyer, 2007), and network theory 
(Mahmood et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2011).   
However, we still do not fully understand why business groups exist and how 
they function, evolve, and thrive to adapt to the ever changing external environment.  
Yiu et al. (2007) comment aptly that diverse theoretical perspectives may hinder, rather 
than contribute to, the further understanding of business groups.  I argue that the 
underlying reason the applications of diverse theories have not led us to a better 
understanding of the business group is that these theories were developed for the firm 
rather than the business group and that scholars have not fully accounted for the 
differences between the two when trying to apply their theories. 
A business group is made up of legally independent firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007).  Each of the member firms develops its own organizational structure and has a 
different mix of shareholders (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  From the 
perspective of minority shareholders, what counts is the performance and value of the 
member firm in which they hold the shares.  Therefore, each member firm has an 
incentive to maximize its shareholder value in order to satisfy its shareholders unless the 
member firm is owned entirely by the controlling shareholder.  Empirical studies on 
business groups that use the business group member firm as the unit of analysis 
implicitly make this assumption of profit maximization.  
However, each member firm of a business group is also influenced by its 
controlling shareholders and the overall business group structure.  In other words, firms 
that have their own boundaries are placed within yet another boundary and the business 
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group to which they belong forms a special operating environment for the member firms.  
This is where confusion about business groups starts because some approximation has to 
be made in order for existing theories about the firm to be applied to the business group.   
In the following subsections, I introduce some of the major theoretical 
perspectives that have been employed to explain business groups.  What I argue is that it 
may not be appropriate to directly apply these perspectives to business groups because 
the perspectives have been developed for firm-level analysis and do not consider the 
market-like characteristics of the business group. 
Transaction cost theory  
Transaction cost theory was developed to explain the existence and scope of the 
firm (Coase, 1937).  According to transaction cost theory, if the market were completely 
efficient, there would be no need for firms to coordinate and control economic activities 
within their boundaries.  However, since certain activities incur more transaction costs 
than other activities, firms arise to handle such activities internally.  It is argued that 
firms will continue to include or exclude activities within their boundaries, which will 
ultimately determine the scope of firms (Williamson, 1979). 
Because transaction costs determine the scope of a business according to 
transaction cost theory, scholars trying to explain business groups based on the theory 
have emphasized differences in overall level of transaction costs across countries caused 
by ‘institutional voids’, that is, weak or missing institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b).  
According to this approach, the business group is a mechanism to cope with market 
failures that increase overall transaction costs of an economy in various areas such as 
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product markets, capital markets, and labor markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Leff, 
1978).   
With this approach, the main empirical question becomes whether the 
organizational form of business group is economically efficient in a particular 
institutional environment.  Scholars have approached the question by comparing the 
economic performance of business group member firms with that of independent firms, 
in countries with varying degrees of institutional deficiency (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  As transaction cost theory has been the most popular 
perspective on business groups (Yiu et al., 2007), most of previous empirical studies on 
business groups have been based on this approach. 
However, despite the popularity of the perspective, transaction cost theory cannot 
directly account for the existence of business groups.  According to the theory, if the 
overall level of transaction costs is high in an economy, more economic activities are 
supposed to be cheaper to carry out within the firm boundary than through the external 
market (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979, 1981).  However, the ultimate consequence of 
high overall level of transaction costs in a country should be the potentially expanded 
scope of firms, not the birth and growth of business groups.  Therefore, transaction cost 
theory does not directly explain why diversified business groups should be more 
prevalent than multidivisional enterprises in emerging markets where transaction costs 
are assumed to be higher than in advanced economies.  Transaction cost theory does not 
consider the business group as an alternative option to the diversified firm.  In other 
words, transaction cost theory may be able to answer the question, “Why do firms 
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exist?”, but it may not be able to answer Granovetter’s (1995) question, “Why do 
business groups exist?”  
Influenced by Leff’s (1978) definition of the business group as a multi-company 
firm, some studies have explicitly regarded the business group as a single multidivisional 
firm to account for the existence of the controlling shareholders as the “control tower” 
(Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000).  In fact, when scholars state that a 
business group is diversified, they implicitly assume that the hierarchy lies at the 
business group level rather than at the firm level.  However, this approach overlooks the 
fact that each individual member firm is a legally independent firm with a different 
ownership structure and enjoys a substantial degree of autonomy (Kock & Guillén, 
2001).  On the other hand, if transaction cost logic is applied to the firm level, it would 
be each individual member firm that chooses its own boundary, perhaps with some 
influence from and consideration for the overall business group structure.  However, in 
this case, because the hierarchy is assumed to be at the level of each member firm, the 
business group’s decision to add or maintain a legally independent member firm cannot 
be explained. 
The direct application of transaction cost theory to the business group also results 
in confusion and inconsistencies in empirical studies of business groups.  Previous 
studies have tested whether business group member firms are economically more 
efficient than stand-alone firms (Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010; Carney et al., 2011; 
Chakrabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007; Chang, 2006; Khanna, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 
2001). 
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  However, if the direct application of transaction cost theory to the level of 
business group is to be strictly followed, the comparison should be made between 
business groups and stand-alone firms, not between business group member firms and 
stand-alone firms.  When business group member firms and stand-alone firms are 
compared, the only difference between the two types of firms becomes business group 
membership, which basically assumes that business groups are homogeneous in nature 
and a membership to any business group has an identical effect.   
Given the structural complexity of business groups, it would be difficult for this 
assumption to hold.  Even though the business group may not have a legal status, it has 
many characteristics that may potentially affect the way its member firms operate.  This 
type of empirical test also goes against transaction cost theory in that business group 
member firms are assumed to autonomously and independently pursue their own 
financial goals, rather than being partially under the hierarchy and authority of their 
business groups where they may be tasked to achieve group-level goals.  
Another issue with the transaction cost approach to business groups based on the 
concept of institutional voids is the ubiquity of business groups even in countries with 
advanced institutions (Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010; Belenzon, Patacconi, & Zelner, 
2012a; Langlois, 2010; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 1998).  This fact makes it 
difficult to claim that the business group is only a coping mechanism for market failures 
arising from institutional voids.  Outside of a few common-law countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, business groups, especially family-controlled 
ones, are very common even in advanced economies (Belenzon et al., 2012a; La Porta et 
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al., 1999; Morck et al., 1998).  Therefore, linking the existence of the business group 
automatically to institutional voids and to the issue of transaction costs may not provide 
a universal theoretical explanation. 
Agency theory 
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) has been used to account for problems 
that can arise from the separation of ownership from control in modern firms (Berle & 
Means, 1932).  However, the focus of scholars taking this approach to business groups is 
not on the classic agency issue between owners and managers, but rather on the 
possibility that controlling shareholders may pursue their own benefits through 
expropriation of the wealth of minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 
2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Yiu et al., 2007).  In the case of family-controlled 
business groups, it is argued that managers of a member firm may strive to work for the 
controlling family rather than for shareholders in general (Morck & Yeung, 2003).  
Scholars argue that expropriation is more likely when the controlling owner uses 
“pyramiding” 5 to maximizing the owner’s control while minimizing actual financial 
contributions (Bertrand et al., 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000). 
As with transaction cost theory, agency theory was developed with an 
independent, autonomous firm in mind (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Because a business 
group is made up of multiple legally independent firms, scholars using agency theory 
                                                 
5 Pyramiding means “owning a majority of the stock of one corporation which in turn holds a majority of 
the stock of another” (Claessens et al., 2000: 93).  
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conceptually view the business group as a collection of agency relationships (Yiu et al., 
2007).  In empirical tests, however, most studies simply focus on each member firm and 
determine whether there is evidence of expropriation at the member firm level based on 
its ownership structure (e.g., Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2002; Chang & Hong, 
2000; Claessens et al., 2002); this approach may not be able to capture how the complex 
structural characteristics of business groups and multiple ties among member firms 
affect each firm’s business strategies.   
For example, Bertrand et al. (2002) concluded that tunneling was widespread 
among Indian business groups after finding out that business group member firms 
profited less from positive industry shocks than stand-alone firms.  However, as Siegel 
and Choudhury (2012) point out, what Bertrand et al. (2002) found that seemingly 
appears to be the consequence of tunneling may arise because business group member 
firms pursue more complex and costly recombinative activities than stand-alone firms.  
Siegel and Choudhury (2012) only consider mere membership to business groups, but 
their finding insinuates that the business group structure and relationships within it may 
lead its member firms to pursue strategies that are different from those of stand-alone 
firms (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).   
Another point to consider about potential expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders is that expropriation may incur costs for them.  Minority shareholders of a 
business group member firm, fully anticipating that there will be expropriation, may 
simply stop investing in the firm (Colpan & Hikino, 2010; Masulis, Pham, & Zein, 
2011).  If minority shareholders do not stop investing, it may be an indication that 
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investing in the firm gives them benefits that at least compensate for the expropriation 
potential.6  One such benefit may come from the reputation that the business group has 
not mistreated minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000), which is actually consistent with 
the notion that business groups can compensate for missing or underdeveloped 
institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  Another benefit, on which this dissertation 
focuses, may come from the firm’s linkages with other member firms within the 
business group and value creation potential arising from those linkages.  Investors may 
appreciate the fact that the business group member firm in which they invest benefits 
from the special market-like environment provided by the business group structure.  
Resource-based theory 
The central idea of resource-based theory is that firms are bundles of resources 
and capabilities (Penrose, 1959) and rare, valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
resources and capabilities lead to a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  Scholars approaching business groups with resource-based theory 
tend to focus on group-level resources rather than resources at the member firm level. 
Resource-based advantages of business groups have been discussed often in 
close connection with institutional voids (e.g., Guillén, 2000; Yiu et al., 2005).  
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), for example, argue that institutional voids foster the 
formation of business groups by making “generalized” resources and capabilities 
                                                 
6 Another possibility is that investors may simply not be able to find a better alternative in which to invest. 
However, the fact that business groups are flourishing in many developed countries and they are not losing 
relevance in countries that are experiencing improvements in terms of institutional environments indicates 
that this possibility cannot explain continued investor interest in business group member firms 
satisfactorily.   
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valuable.  Project-execution capabilities (Amsden & Hikino, 1994), the capability for 
repeated industry entry (Guillén, 2000), and the capability to leverage contacts (Kock & 
Guillén, 2001) may be examples of such resources.  Guillén (2000) also argues that such 
generic capabilities may lose value over time as institutions improve and foreign trade 
and investment asymmetries between the emerging country and developed countries 
disappear. 
However, trying to locate resource advantages solely at the level of the business 
group may obscure the role of each member firm, and overlook the question of how 
member firms obtain and develop their own resources and capabilities within the 
business group boundary (Mahmood et al., 2011).  Like transaction cost theory and 
agency theory, resource-based theory was originally developed for independent and 
autonomous firms (Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  Focusing only on group-level 
resources may miss the presence of firm-level resources and the potential that member 
firms may build resources and capabilities either by themselves or in concert with other 
member firms to improve their firm-level competitiveness.   
Chang and Hong (2000) overcome some of these limitations by studying the 
firm-level performance implications of within-group resource sharing and business 
transactions, but they still do not provide an answer to the question of how business 
group member firms may collectively engage in the formation and integration of 
resources and capabilities.  To reach a more complete understanding of the business 
group, I argue that we need to examine resources and capabilities on both business group 
level and firm level, rather than focusing on either level.  To do that, we have to realize 
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that the each of the two levels – business group level and member firm level – has 
distinct characteristics. 
Social network theory 
As Granovetter’s (1995) influential definition of business groups indicates, 
business groups are rich in formal and informal linkages among member firms.  
Therefore, some recent studies employ social network theory to study business groups.  
Viewing business groups as networks and member firms as nodes, the studies use 
network-theoretic concepts such as centrality and tie density to explain firm-level or 
business group-level outcomes (Mahmood et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2011; Smångs, 
2006).  
Mahmood et al. (2011) regard a business group as an external source of R&D 
capability acquisition for its member firms.  They argue and find that a member firm’s 
centrality in the intragroup buyer-supplier network contributes to the firm’s R&D 
capability.  They further show that characteristics of other types of network ties, such as 
intragroup director and equity ties, either strengthen or weaken the main hypothesized 
relationship.  This study, focusing on the level of member firms, regards the business 
group simply as existing outside the boundary of each member firm.  On the other hand, 
Mahmood et al. (2013) use the business group as the unit of analysis to argue and find 
that the density of intragroup buyer-supplier ties has an inverted-U shaped relationship 
with group innovativeness. 
The network theoretic approach can capture the overall structure of the business 
group and the position of each member firm nicely.  However, it is the controlling 
 27 
 
shareholders that initially design member firms’ embeddedness in the business group 
network.  Treating a business group as a network and assuming that each node (member 
firm) is completely independent overlooks the fact that the controlling shareholders can 
design and structure the overall business group linkages.   
Diversification and Relatedness 
 Why do firms diversify?  It is one of the fundamental questions in the strategic 
management field (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991).  Under the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, the firm is simply a production function that specializes on a 
single type of product.  When the market is perfect and so there are no frictional costs of 
transacting through the market, diversification may not be justifiable.  Therefore, the 
widespread existence of firm diversification indicates that there is some degree of 
imperfection in the market (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Klein & Lien, 2009).  Indeed, if the 
assumption of competitive equilibrium held perfectly and managerial actions did not 
affect firm performance, the whole purpose of strategic management would be moot 
because the field seeks answers on how to gain sustainable competitive advantages 
through managerial actions.  Therefore, any type of diversification – be it related or 
unrelated – may be thought of as an action to take advantage of or respond to market 
imperfections.   
 One of the most important factors that contribute to market imperfections, and 
thus to diversification, are firm resources (Barney, 1986, 1991; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 
1991; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982).  Certain resources are difficult to trade on the market 
because of their indivisibility (Penrose, 1959) and social complexity (Coff, 1999; 
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Jonsson & Regnér, 2009).  These problems may lead managers to take advantage of their 
excess resources in another, related business where the slack resources can be used 
either as substitutes or complements (Klein & Lien, 2009).  In this line of logic, 
operating in related businesses may yield synergies for the firm, causing performance to 
improve (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974). 
 Another important factor that causes market imperfection and thus diversification 
are transaction costs (Williamson, 1979).  When the costs of organizing activities within 
the boundary of the firm are lower than the costs of transacting with external parties, it 
becomes more efficient for the firm to diversify into those activities.  Because the level 
of transaction costs is substantially dependent upon the nature of resources and 
capabilities behind the business activities, it may be said that the two factors – resources 
and transaction costs – are intricately tied with each other in determining the scope of the 
firm (Argyres, 2011; Jacobides, 2008; Jacobides & Winter, 2005).    
 Therefore, even though there are other potential antecedents of diversification 
such as government policy (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Scherer, 1980), low 
performance (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Rumelt, 1974; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), 
and cash flow uncertainty (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988), resources and transaction costs may 
be considered as the two main drivers that determine the economic efficiency of 
diversification.   
The implication of the combination of these two factors is that a diversification 
strategy based on the relatedness criterion may create value by conferring synergistic 
benefits on the firm (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988).  
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Moreover, these benefits should continue until the costs of managing activities internally 
go over those of transacting with outside parties. 
 Unrelated diversification obviously violates the relatedness criterion.  Therefore, 
it has been viewed negatively even though unrelated diversification has the potential for 
financial synergies (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Chatterjee, 1986) and there are some 
prominently successful conglomerates such as General Electric or Siemens.  Unrelated 
diversification has often been regarded as a sign of top managers’ self-interest seeking 
behavior (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
Because it is hard to justify unrelated diversification based on pure efficiency 
considerations, scholars tend to link it to market failures and resulting high transaction 
costs that characterize underdeveloped countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001).  In underdeveloped and emerging economies, unrelated diversification 
tends to take the form of the business group.  This is the reason that business groups 
have often been regarded as prime examples of unrelated diversification even though 
they are fundamentally different from conglomerates.   
In this dissertation, I argue that business group diversification is different from 
ordinary firm diversification in terms of its purpose.  To show that it is the case, I 
emphasize the fact that industries have linkages with one another and some industries 
have more linkages than others.  Business groups, as collections of firms, have a unique 
advantage in exploiting this inter-industry linkages compared with stand-alone firms.  I 
argue that unlike stand-alone firms, business groups diversify to bridge such linkages 
than to obtain synergies from operating in related industries. 
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CHAPTER III 
GROUP-LEVEL DIVERSIFICATION AND INTER-INDUSTRY LINKAGES 
 
Introduction 
Business group level diversification represents the span of industries in which all 
the member firms of a business group engage.  It is fundamentally related to the initial 
formation of business groups because the first decision of the controlling shareholders to 
diversify by starting a new firm instead of diversifying within the existing firm’s 
boundary initiates a business group.  Why would the controlling shareholders set up 
another firm to diversify rather than diversify within the existing firm?  
For a stand-alone firm, an excessively high level of diversification is generally 
known to be negative for performance (Ansoff, 1987; Markides & Williamson, 1996; 
Palich et al., 2000).  Diversification makes it possible for the firm to utilize excess firm-
specific assets (Markides, 1992; Penrose, 1959), gain economies of scope through 
sharing resources and activities (Markides & Williamson, 1994), and use superior 
internal information to allocate resources among different lines of business more 
efficiently than the market (Markides, 1992).  However, as the degree of relatedness 
goes down among different lines of business, such positive effects may deteriorate and 
various costs of management may begin to increase (Grant, Jammine, & Thomas, 1988; 
Markides, 1992).  As activities within a firm become too disparate, the purpose of the 
firm may become less coherent (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994) and social 
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comparison costs among its employees may increase (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008), 
eventually causing the firm’s performance to deteriorate.   
This line of logic has been directly applied to business groups even though 
business groups are not firms but collections of firms.  The business group is often 
referred to as the quintessential form of unrelated diversification (Hoskisson et al., 2005; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Kock & Guillén, 2001), where each member firm is commonly 
assumed to represent a different line of business or strategic business unit (Chang & 
Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000; Ferris et al., 2002; Leff, 1978).  The logic based on 
the relatedness criterion has been commonly used to discredit the business group as an 
inefficient organizational form that can only work in poor quality institutional 
environments.  Scholars argue that business groups are diversified widely to compensate 
for and take advantage of institutional weaknesses (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b).  Some 
scholars propose that business groups will lose their purpose and increasingly refocus 
their business portfolios as institutional environments improve (Hoskisson et al., 2005). 
In this chapter, I argue that group-level diversification should not be evaluated 
based on the same criteria that apply to firm-level corporate diversification because 
business groups, as “hybrid” organizations (Granovetter, 1995; Williamson, 1991), are 
not equivalent to firms.  Within the boundary of a business group, thanks to formal 
and/or informal ties, its member firms as independent legal entities can transact with one 
another without getting exposed to various exchange hazards (Granovetter, 1995; Luo & 
Chung, 2005).  Given this market-like function of the business group, the purpose of 
diversification pursued by the business group may be more to provide its member firms 
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with strategic resources (by setting up a well-functioning market within its boundary) 
than to pursue synergies from operating in related industries as in the case of the firm. 
To explore this possibility, I focus on the strategic importance of inter-industry 
linkages (Burt, Guilarte, Raider, & Yasuda, 2002; Chenery & Watanabe, 1958; 
Hirschman, 1958; Lemelin, 1982; Rasmussen, 1956) for business groups.  I argue that a 
business group is likely to enter an industry that is related to many other industries.  
Entering an industry that has an impact on multiple other industries may provide the 
group’s member firms with rich and crucial linkages with the rest of the economy.  The 
implication is that a business group may encourage its member firms to pursue related 
diversification by pursuing unrelated, but still strategic, diversification at the group level.  
Figure 2 graphically presents the three hypotheses that are presented in this chapter. 
To empirically test these hypotheses, I analyze the diversification patterns of 30 
major South Korean business groups from 1999 to 2008 using categorizations and data 
available in South Korean input-output tables prepared by the Bank of Korea.  Input-
output flows among 77 industries are used to determine the impact an industry has on the 
rest of the economy (Burt et al., 2002).   
Prior research on diversification has mainly focused on the degree of 
diversification starting from a firm’s primary industry based on the concept of 
relatedness (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Rumelt, 1974).  This chapter extends the 
diversification literature by turning attention to the inherent linkages among various 
industries and the importance of multiple impacts an industry may have for other 
industries (Chang, 1999; Hirschman, 1958).  Previous research on business groups tend 
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to depict them as an organizational form that cannot function efficiently in the 
environment with strong and advanced institutions (Guillén, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 
2005; Kock & Guillén, 2001).  Examining business groups’ diversification patterns 
through the lens of inter-industry linkages may reveal that business groups are highly 
strategic in their diversification choices.  Theoretically, it may indicate that business 
groups are less of an outcome of institutional voids, but more of a consequence of 
pursuits for critical resources and growth opportunities (Lamin, 2013; Manikandan & 
Ramachandran, 2014).  If it is the case, business groups will certainly not lose their 
relevance even after institutional environments in emerging markets and developing 
countries reach a similar level of quality to that of developed countries.   
Theory and Hypotheses 
Nature of the business group   
The business group is characterized by an “‘intermediate’ level of binding” 
(Granovetter, 1995:95).  Even though there may be some degree of integration among 
the member firms of a business group with the presence of the controlling shareholders 
(Guillén, 2010; Morck, 2010), the member firms are legally independent (Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007) and typically enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy (Kock & Guillén, 
2001; Smångs, 2006).  While some studies have treated business groups as if they were 
single multidivisional firms (Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000; Leff, 1978), 
business groups themselves are typically not legal entities.  It is each member firm that is 
a legal entity. 
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Business group member firms, with their own unique ownership and 
organizational structures, have their own corporate-level strategies.  Each member firm 
has its own top management team and is overseen by its own board of directors, which 
may assess market opportunities independently from the controlling shareholders.  
Unlike a division in a multidivisional firm, an individual business group member firm 
has the autonomy to make its own decisions to pursue growth opportunities and directly 
face consequences of the decisions in the market (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 
2014).7  Indeed, some business group member firms are widely diversified themselves 
(Carney et al., 2011).   
 On the other hand, business group member firms are inevitably affected by the 
business group structure.  When member firms transact with one another within the 
boundary of the business group, they may face few exchange hazards, if any, thanks to 
trust arising from formal and/or informal ties among them (Manikandan & 
Ramachandran, 2014).  However, when member firms transact with parties outside the 
business group, they may face the same degree of exchange hazards as stand-alone firms 
do.  Therefore, business group member firms have strong economic incentives to take 
full advantage of their business group membership by transacting within the boundary of 
the business group. 
                                                 
7 This will definitely be the case for publicly listed business group member firms.  However, even if they 
are not publicly listed, business group member firms are different from a multidivisional firm’s divisions, 
whose managers lack not only market-based incentives but also ultimate decision rights to pursue growth 
opportunities (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  
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 In summary, the business group is a “hybrid” organization (Granovetter, 1995; 
Williamson, 1991).  It is close to a firm in that the controlling shareholders form a 
hierarchy, while it is like a market in that member firms within the business group 
boundary enjoy transactional relationships that may be more efficient and flexible than 
those available outside the boundary.  Therefore, treating the business group as if it were 
equivalent to the firm may discount this market-like role of the business group.   
 Unrelated diversification and business groups 
It is generally agreed upon in the field of strategic management that related 
diversification leads to superior firm performance while unrelated diversification is 
harmful for firm performance (Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Wan et al., 2011).  
Extended to business groups, this consensus has been commonly used to discredit the 
business group as an inefficient organizational form that can only work in poor 
institutional environments because business groups are typically diversified widely into 
unrelated industries (Hoskisson et al., 2005; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Kock & Guillén, 
2001). 
Considering the market-like nature of the business group, however, opens up a 
new possibility.  Given such market-like nature, the purpose of diversification that a 
business group pursues may be fundamentally different from that of a firm which 
represents a pure hierarchy.  The controlling shareholders of a business group may focus 
on establishing a relevant and well-functioning group-wide market from which the 
group’s member firms can benefit rather than try to control every aspect of the group-
wide business portfolios.  In turn, member firms’ top managers may have a greater sense 
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of control over their own resources than those of division managers of a single 
multidivisional firm (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014); as a result, they may try to 
devise strategies that have the potential to maximize benefits of business group 
membership.  Therefore, for a business group, unrelated diversification may not be a bad 
idea: a business group may engage in unrelated diversification to provide its member 
firms with a better special market with more critical resources so that its member firms 
need not diversify too far from their core activities. 
Manikandan and Ramachandran (2014) argue and provide evidence that business 
group member firms enjoy greater opportunities to grow than stand-alone firms and 
these opportunities become even greater as the diversity of group-wide portfolio goes up.  
This evidence clearly indicates that the purpose of business group diversification may be 
different from that of firm diversification.  Business groups may be concerned more 
about spurring growth of their member firms through the provision of critical resources 
than about obtaining synergies by choosing to pursue activities that are related with their 
core business. 
The business group’s market-making function has long been emphasized in 
connection with weak and underdeveloped institutions (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Leff, 1978).  Scholars have argued that business groups can benefit from bridging and 
filling the missing advanced institutions (e.g., strong rule of law) that their own country 
environment lacks.  Interestingly, this logic implicitly assumes that markets will always 
function efficiently when there are no institutional voids.  In addition to the issue of 
determining what really constitutes “institutional voids”, the assumption is clearly 
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unrealistic given the fact that the whole justification of the existence of the firm comes 
from the realization that markets are not always efficient (Coase, 1937). 
Manikandan and Ramachandran (2014), emphasizing the incomplete nature of 
markets (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003), argue that business groups have a unique 
strength in that they provide their member firms with privileged access to resources that 
may not be available through external strategic factor markets.  When the 
incompleteness of external markets, irrespective of the degree of institutional 
developments, is considered, it becomes obvious that the business group form has the 
potential merit that is not exclusively based on institutional factors.   
Furthermore, while a firm that engages in unrelated diversification may risk 
losing its corporate coherence (Teece et al., 1994), a business group that does the same 
thing may not suffer the same consequence because it is not a firm but a collection of 
firms, which can establish coherence collectively.  Even though a business group may 
consist of multiple divergent lines of businesses, its member firms can stay coherent 
pursuing related diversification with their own legal identities, creating their own sets of 
stakeholders and governance mechanisms (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  
Therefore, the criterion of relatedness that is highly relevant for a firm may not be so 
meaningful for the business group. 
Business group diversification and inter-industry linkages   
If the business group’s purpose for diversification is to provide its member firms 
with a more attractive market with crucial resources, what type of industries will the 
business group target? 
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Prior research on diversification does not provide an answer to this question 
because scholars have focused mainly on measuring the degree of relatedness among a 
firm’s different business lines (Caves, Porter, & Spence, 1980; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, 
& Moesel, 1993; Pehrsson, 2006; Rumelt, 1974).  This approach may be called a firm-
centric approach to relatedness because the approach focuses on potential synergistic 
effects arising from diversification within the firm.  According to this way of measuring 
relatedness, no matter how relatedness is specifically measured, diversifying into an 
unrelated industry is just not desirable.  Therefore, it does not provide any suggestion on 
how to pursue unrelated diversification as a business group.  Given that the diversity of a 
business group may afford its member firms with unique resource sets to work with 
(Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014), it may be important for a business group to 
maximize the strategic impact of its diversification choices.  In other words, at the 
business group level, what matters may be the strategic impact of an industry rather than 
potential synergies among activities within the group. 
I therefore propose an industry-centric approach to relatedness for business group 
diversification.  As Leontief’s (1986) input-output model indicates, interdependencies 
exist among different industries.  The idea that some industries are more important 
because they have more linkages with the rest of the economy has been commonly used 
in development economics and regional studies for many years.  Hirschman (1958), for 
example, argues for a strategy of unbalanced growth that emphasizes promoting 
industries with strong linkages with other industries.  For an individual firm that has to 
maintain coherence of its existence (Teece et al., 1994), inter-industry linkages may be 
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just a matter of whether one industry is related to another industry that may be 
considered as a suitable entry target.  Indeed, some scholars have tried to measure 
relatedness using inter-industry linkages (Lemelin, 1982; Villalonga, 2004; Zhou, 2011).  
For a business group, however, varying levels of inter-industry linkages among different 
industries may present important clues to the business group on what industries to enter 
to better support the overall economic efficiency of the entire group. 
Diversification choices of business groups 
Related industries.  As has been discussed in Chapter II, many scholars consider 
a business group as essentially a firm with many different divisions that operate in 
unrelated businesses under a single hierarchy that is ultimately controlled by the 
controlling shareholders (Leff, 1978).   
Teece et al. (1994) found U.S. manufacturing firms maintained their corporate 
coherence8 even when they engaged in many different activities and concluded that 
firms typically expand by diversifying into related activities.  Teece et al. suggested that 
firms that pursue unrelated diversification, because of low path-dependency and slow 
learning, would not be able to survive in a tight selection environment characterized by 
intense competition.  Kogut and Zander (1996) propose that coherence is not just the 
outcome of path dependency and efficiency seeking but also the consequence of pursuit 
of social identity, without which cognitive dissonance and conflict arise among 
members.  If business groups are regarded as firms with a single hierarchy, they cannot 
                                                 
8 Teece et al. (1994: 2) explains the concept of coherence as follows: “Firms are coherent to the extent that 
their constituent businesses are related to one another.” 
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be immune from these issues.  Therefore, when the controlling shareholders of a 
business group intend to expand into an additional industry, they will be likely to choose 
an industry to which the business group’s existing operation is related. 
The same conclusion can be made even when the approach that equates business 
groups to firms is not taken.  A business group is a collection of its member firms at any 
given time.  Therefore, the diversification of a business group is represented by the 
aggregated business portfolios of its member firms.  Because business group member 
firms may follow the logic of diversification that pursues synergies (Rumelt, 1974), the 
overall diversification pattern of a business group will incorporate the relatedness 
criterion.  Even if a business group is widely diversified into various industries, its 
member firms will still be operating in a narrower domain, specializing on activities that 
make them stay coherent (Teece et al., 1994).  This basically means that if a business 
group is operating in a certain industry, it is more likely for the business group, as a 
collective entity, to enter another industry that is related with the industry.  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1. A business group is more likely to enter an industry if the business 
group participates in a related industry. 
 Strategic industries.  In fact, a business group is more than just a collection of 
member firms.  Its member firms transact with one another in a special market-like 
environment characterized by rich social ties, enhanced trust, and lowered transaction 
costs (Granovetter, 1995; Luo & Chung, 2005).  Moreover, member firms may be able 
to get access to the various knowledge, know-how, and social connections of other firms 
 41 
 
within the boundary of the business group even without actually transacting with them 
thanks to the diminished potential of opportunism (Lamin, 2013).   
The business group structure may represent a special marketplace where the 
member firm can evaluate the value of its own resources in relation to other member 
firms’ resources, to which the firm may have a relatively unrestricted access thanks to 
the group’s formal and informal ties.  This may lead to growth opportunities that may 
not be obvious in markets outside the boundary of the business group due to the 
incomplete nature of strategic factor markets (Denrell et al., 2003; Manikandan & 
Ramachandran, 2014).  Given such potential benefits for the member firms, the 
controlling shareholders of a business group may strive to set up an overall business 
group portfolio that can provide the maximum exposure of strategic resources and 
capabilities to its member firms.   
 In the field of strategic management, relatedness has been mostly discussed 
regarding a firm’s multiple activities.  It is natural because the main concern of the field 
is the firm and how it can create competitive advantages through strategic actions (Nag, 
Hambrick, & Chen, 2007; Schendel & Hofer, 1979).  When it comes to diversification, 
the consensus in the field is that a firm should be relatively focused and should pursue 
diversification when it can expect synergies arising from the relatedness of the new 
industry and the existing business portfolio of the firm (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 
1988; Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974).  For a business group, however, given its 
market-like characteristic, the main goal may be to create an environment in which its 
member firms can pursue such a path of diversification rather than to do it itself. 
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For a business group, an industry that has linkages with multiple other industries 
may be especially attractive.  This is where inter-industry linkages become relevant.  
First, by operating in such an industry, the business group will be able to maximize the 
impact of a diversifying move in terms of giving the member firms as much access and 
exposure to the entire economy as possible.  This will help the member firms to get 
access to valuable information that can lead them to come up with alternative uses of and 
extensions to their own existing resources (Denrell et al., 2003).  Linkages with multiple 
other industries may also provide the member firms with crucial market information 
without their needing to expand into areas unrelated to their existing portfolios (Lamin, 
2013).   
Second, entering an industry with multiple linkages can lower the member firms’ 
dependency on external markets more effectively than entering an industry with limited 
linkages.  Lowering external market dependency of the member firms can be particularly 
important for the controlling shareholders of the business group because the member 
firms will get exposed to the same transaction conditions with stand-alone firms outside 
the boundary of the business group (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Diversifying into 
industries that have impacts on multiple other industries may be a way to promoting 
advantageous within-group transactions among the member firms.   
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2.  The more linkages to other industries an industry has, the more 
likely it is for a business group to make a new entry into that industry. 
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 Interaction between relatedness and strategic value.  The business group’s 
rationale behind choosing to enter an industry that has linkages to multiple other 
industries is to provide its member firms with advantages in strategic resources.  The 
value of such an industry may be reduced if a member of the business group is already 
participating in an industry that is related to the potential target industry.  By operating 
in an adjacent industry, the business group may already be able to access critical market 
information that can be gained by entering the potential target industry (Lamin, 2013).  
On the flip side, the potential value of an industry with linkages to multiple other 
industries as an entry target will be enhanced if the business group is not currently 
operating in an industry related to it. 
Moreover, the controlling shareholders of a business group may try to avoid 
interfering with the natural expansion of a member firm that operates in an adjacent 
industry by refraining from setting up a new firm or acquiring an existing firm in the 
specific strategic industry.  Therefore, the presence of a related industry in a business 
group’s portfolio may actually decrease the likelihood that the business group will enter 
the potential target industry with high strategic impact.   
Hypothesis 3.  The positive relationship between the number of industry linkages 
of an industry and a business group’s likelihood of a new entry is weakened 
when the business group participates in an industry related to the target industry. 
Data and Methods 
 I test the hypotheses above using the industry participation and entry data for 30 
major South Korean business groups from 1998 to 2008.  The unit of analysis is the 
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business group year for each industry.  Because I use 77 industry categories and cover 
the 10 year period between 1999 and 2008, the total number of observations should be 
23,100.  However, not all business groups in the sample are present throughout the 
period and there are some missing values.  This reduces the sample size to 18,326.  
Because this study explores the factors that may affect a business group’s new industry 
entry decision, the cases where the business group is already present in a specific 
industry in the previous year are excluded.  In the end, 14,344 observations are used for 
data analyses in this chapter. 
Business group data 
 Studies on South Korean business groups have commonly focused on the top 30 
business groups (e.g., Bae & Jeong, 2007; Chang & Hong, 2000, 2002).  This practice 
originated from the fact that the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), until recently, 
identified and designated top 30 business groups annually based on the value of their 
total assets.  Even though smaller business groups are organized in a similar way to that 
of larger groups, data on smaller business groups are more limited due to the fact that the 
business group is not a legal entity.  While some business groups stay in the list of top 30 
for the duration of the study period, others disappear from the list.  The sample for this 
dissertation includes the 30 major business groups that were on the KFTC list for at least 
two consecutive years.   
 I used multiple sources to collect data.  Most of the data were collected from the 
Data Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer (DART) system, which is maintained by the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) of the South Korean government.  This system 
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provides all the publicly available reports of all the listed firms and firms that are subject 
to external audits from 1998 on.  I selected 2008 as the final year of the sample because 
the change of the format of annual reports made it difficult to clearly identify industries 
in which a firm operated in the report period.  I supplemented the data from the DART 
with data from the KFTC, which provides more detailed specific information on major 
business groups.   
Industry data 
The industries are defined according to the 77 aggregated industry categories of 
the South Korean input-output tables, which are published by the Bank of Korea.  I use 
aggregated industry categories for several reasons.  First, the more detailed industry 
categories have changed over the years, while the aggregated categories stay the same.  
Therefore, by relying on the aggregated categories, a longer longitudinal dataset can be 
created and more timely sets of data can be used for statistical analyses.  Given that the 
pace of environmental changes has accelerated because of globalization and 
technological innovations (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010), incorporating changes in 
inter-industry linkages may be profoundly important.   
Second, the aggregated categories are more likely to fit the descriptions of 
operational portfolios of business group member firms than the more detailed categories 
(Burt et al., 2002).  Because I depend on business group member firms’ annual reports to 
find industries in which they are present and to which they make entries, larger numbers 
of categories could have resulted in more errors in collecting the data points.  The Bank 
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of Korea releases input-output tables every five years, so I use input-output tables from 
three different years (1995, 2000, and 2005) to cover the study period of 1999-2008.9   
Annual data on business groups’ business portfolios and new entries are collected 
from their member firms’ annual reports available on the DART system.  To code each 
business group’s diversification into each of the 77 industries, I first began by 
identifying all the member firms of the business group annually from 1998 to 2008.  
Each of the member firms was checked for its major products and industry presence 
based on the firm’s official reports filed in the DART system and whether the firm 
operated in each of the 77 industries was recorded.  After the industry portfolios of all 
the firms of each business group were completely coded, I aggregated them into the 
business group industry portfolio by recording the industries that were covered by the 
business group’s member firms.      
Variables 
  Dependent variable.  The dependent variable (ENTRYijt) is a dummy variable 
indicating whether business group i entered industry j in year t.   
Independent variables.  The strategic impact in terms of inter-industry linkages 
(IMPACTjt-1) measures the number of industries that are related to industry j in year t-1.  
Whether two industries are related is determined by the input-output ‘use’ tables using 
the one percent threshold (Lemelin, 1982; Zhou, 2011), that is two industries (X and Y) 
                                                 
9 I used the 1995 input-output table for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000, the 2000 table for the years 2001 
through 2005, and the 2005 table for the years 2006 through 2008.  Using an input-output table that 
matches a given period of time may better reflect changes in industrial organization and technology than 
using just one year’s input-output table as in Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton (2009). 
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are deemed related when one industry (X) provides the other (Y) with more than one 
percent of its (Y’s) inputs.  I assign a dummy variable value of 1 when two industries are 
related and 0 otherwise.  I then count the number of related industries for each industry j 
in year t-1; the higher the number is, the more linkages j has with other industries.   
Relatedness (RELATED jt-1) measures whether the business group operates in 
another industry that belongs to the broader categorization of a particular industry. The 
broader categorization scheme of the input-output tables consists of 28 industries.    
Control variables.  Several control variables were included in the empirical tests.  
Business group control variables included size, group-wide profit, age, business group 
scope (number of industries), and number of member firms.   
In terms of size, a larger business group may have more resources to undertake 
more frequent diversification.  I measured the size of a business group using either the 
logarithm of total assets or the logarithm of sales (which are highly correlated with each 
other with the correlation coefficient of 0.96) to minimize the potential for 
multicollinearity.   
Group-wide profit may affect the likelihood of diversification either positively 
through the provision of free cash flow or negatively because of inertia.  I use the 
logarithm of group-wide profit to make the distribution closer to normal because the 
distribution of the original variable shows an extreme level of kurtosis (17.18).10  The 
group-wide profit data were from the KFTC’s database of large-scale business groups.   
                                                 
10 I made each of the original values of the profitability variable positive before taking logarithm because it 
is impossible to take logarithm on a negative value. 
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I also added business group age because younger business groups may be more 
active in diversification.  Scholars have suggested that firms in early stages of 
development tend to be more aggressive in their diversification strategies (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011) and it may be reasonable to 
apply the same logic to business groups. 
The problem with some of these business group control variables is that the 
effect of size dominates the variables.  Larger business groups tend to enjoy higher 
performance than smaller ones (Carney, 2004; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).  
Moreover, it is rather obvious that a larger business group is likely to be in a higher 
number of industries and have more member firms than a smaller business group.  The 
sample data show these relationships clearly.  The correlation coefficient between 
business group total assets and profit is 0.86.  The correlation coefficient between 
business group total assets and business group scope is 0.67, while the correlation 
coefficient between business group total assets and number of member firms is 0.71.  
Therefore, it is problematic to use all these variables together in a same model. 
To solve this problem, I measure profitability, scope and number of member 
firms independent of business group size by (1) running a regression model with each of 
the three variables as the dependent variable and business group size as the sole 
independent variable and (2) capturing the residuals of the model as the values of each 
variable.  In this way, each of the variables captures unique variances that cannot be 
explained by business group size.  For example, to calculate the size-independent 
business group scope, I first run a linear regression model with business group scope as 
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the dependent variable and logged total assets as the sole independent variable.  The 
residuals from this model become the values of the new size-independent scope variable.  
This new variable is not correlated with logged total assets, but still highly correlated 
with the original scope variable with the correlation coefficient of 0.74.11 
I also included industry controls: size and growth rate.  I expected the bigger the 
industry, the more likely it would be for a business group to enter.  I also expected the 
growth rate of an industry to positively affect the likelihood of a business group’s entry.  
The size and growth rate of an industry were measured based on the total production 
value of that industry, based on data available from the Bank of Korea.   
In addition, at the country level, I controlled for the annual growth rate of South 
Korean GDP to account for yearly fluctuation in national economic activities. 
All of the independent variables and control variables are lagged one year.  Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample along with the brief description of each of 
the variables.  Table 3 lists the pair-wise correlation coefficients between variables. 
Statistical methods 
For all of the hypotheses, I test the probability that a particular business group i 
enters a particular industry j, where the business group did not previously operate in a 
particular year t.  Therefore, logistic regression models were used to estimate the 
probabilities in question.  To guard against potential heteroskedasticity problems, I used 
                                                 
11 The new size-independent business group profitability variable and the size-independent number of 
member firms variable were also highly correlated with their raw counterparts with the correlation 
coefficients of 0.52 and 0.73, respectively.  The correlation coefficient for profitability is relatively low.  
This may indicate that the positive effect of business group size on business group profitability is quite 
strong (Carney et al., 2011).    
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robust standard errors based on the Huber-White estimators (Huber, 1967; White, 1982).  
I also used standard errors clustered by each business group to compensate for potential 
bias arising from multiple data points per business group.   
I used two alternative statistical models to deal with the uniqueness of the 
dataset.  First, I used multilevel logistic regression to account for the fact that the dataset 
has a nested structure.  The structure of the data can be seen as 77 industries that can be 
entered by each of the business groups.  Second, I used a penalized likelihood method 
proposed by Firth (1993) to account for the fact that a new industry entry is a rare event.  
Among 14,344 observations in the sample, the number of new industry entries is only 
123, which is approximately 0.85 percent of the total number of observations.  Using 
Firth’s logistic regression approach may help reduce the potential bias that can arise 
from the low prevalence of outcomes (Heinze & Schemper, 2002).   
I estimated all the models using STATA 12.1.  For the estimation of the Firth 
logistic regression model, I used the Stata module developed by Coveney (2008). 
Results 
Table 4 presents the estimated effect of the control variables and independent 
variables on business group diversification choices.  Columns (1) and (2) show the 
logistic regression model with only the control variables.  Because total assets and sales 
for each business group are highly correlated, I only used total assets in column (1) and 
total sales in column (2).  The estimated effect of the control variables did not show 
much difference.  Thus, I only used total assets in the subsequent models.   
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To examine the potential that the model may suffer from multicollinearity, I 
checked the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the variables based on the linear 
regression form of the full specification.12  Strategic impact of the industry had the 
highest level of VIF (1.44) among the variables and the mean VIF was 1.20, which 
indicates that the models are not likely to suffer from multicollinearity.  The correlation 
coefficients between any two variables are generally tame, as shown in Table 3, which 
also provides evidence that multicollinearity is not a serious concern.13 
Column (1) shows that the only statistically significant control variable in 
explaining the likelihood of entry into an industry is the size of the industry.  Obviously 
a large industry should attract and sustain a large number of firms.  It is important to 
note that because the size of the industry has already been accounted for, we can be 
assured that the effect of independent variables has little to do with the industry size 
effect.  The coefficients for total assets, profit, industry growth rate and GDP growth rate 
are positive but not statistically significant, while the coefficients for the business 
group’s scope and number of member firms are negative and non-significant.   
Column (3) displays the result when the relatedness variable is added to the 
controls-only model, and column (4) shows the result when the strategic impact variable 
                                                 
12 According to Hitt et al. (2006), using ordinary least square models to calculate the VIF statistics 
provides more conservative test in terms of detecting potential multicollinearity. 
13 The highest correlation is between strategic impact and industry size (r = 0.47).  To dispel any concern 
that the strategic impact of an industry may be predominantly determined by its size, I also calculated a 
size-independent measure of strategic impact based on the same method I used for the business group 
control variables and used the size-adjusted variable instead of the non-adjusted variable in the statistical 
models. The correlation coefficient between size-adjusted measure of strategic impact and non-adjusted 
measure was 0.88, which indicates that an industry’s strategic impact is not predominantly determined by 
its size.  The overall results were nearly identical.   
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is added to the model shown in column (3).  The addition of each variable improves the 
previous model significantly as indicated by the significance of the log-likelihood test.  
Column (5) presents the result for the fully specified logistic regression model 
including the two independent variables and the interaction term.  I based the tests of my 
hypotheses on this fully specified model because the coefficients and p-values of this 
model are the most appropriate ones to interpret (Echambadi, Campbell, & Agarwal, 
2006; Edwards, 2009; Stone-Romero & Liakhovitski, 2002). 
In Hypothesis 1, I hypothesize that a business group is more likely to enter an 
industry if the business group participates in a related industry.  In column (3), the 
coefficient for relatedness is positive and highly statistically significant (p < 0.01), 
strongly supporting the hypothesis.     
In Hypothesis 2, I hypothesize that a business group is more likely to enter an 
industry if it has linkages with multiple other industries.  In column (3), the coefficient 
for impact, which represents the number of related industries in the focal industry, is also 
positive and highly statistically significant (p < 0.01), providing solid support to 
Hypothesis 2.   
In Hypothesis 3, I expected that the likelihood of entry into a strategic industry 
that has many linkages with other industries will be lower when the business group is 
already operating in a related industry.  In column (3), the coefficient for the interaction 
term is negative as expected but not statistically significant (p = 0.36).  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 receives no support from the data. 
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Column (6) shows the coefficients and p-values of the variables that were 
obtained from the multilevel logistic regression, taking into account the fact that the 
choices to enter 77 industries are nested within each business group.  The outcome is not 
materially different from the results obtained from the logistic regression analysis.  
Column (7) presents the result of the Firth logistic regression analysis, which takes into 
account the fact that entries to new industries are rare events.  The coefficients and p-
values in column (7) indicate that the results are consistent with that of the logistic 
regression model.      
Discussion 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to argue and show the evidence that there 
needs to be an alternative explanation for business group diversification.  Unlike a stand-
alone firm that is under a unitary hierarchy, a business group member firm can be said to 
have two different hierarchies: the hierarchy of its own and that of the business group to 
which the firm belongs.  For the member firm, the hierarchy of the business group means 
a special marketplace where the firm can transact and interact with other member firms 
of the business group in an environment that can be characterized by a high level of trust 
and a low potential for opportunism (Granovetter, 1995; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 
2014).  Therefore, even though most prior studies on business groups have treated them 
as if they were firms, a business group has both the characteristics of a firm (in that the 
business group is a hierarchy) and those of a market (in that the business group provides 
resources and facilitates transactions among the members).   
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Because a business group is a collection of firms, when the portfolios of a certain 
business group’s member firms are aggregated, the business group’s pattern of 
diversification will inherently follow that of ordinary firms.  Hypothesis 1 captures this 
aspect of business group diversification and it receives strong support from the sample 
data of this study.   
However, at the same time, a business group is much more than a collection of 
firms.  The business group can protect its member firms from the harsh external 
environment by providing critical strategic resources that may not always be available 
through strategic factor markets because of their incompleteness (Denrell et al., 2003).  
The controlling shareholders may choose how to diversify the business group as a whole 
to provide resources that are critical for the growth of the member firms.  Providing 
critical resources for the member firms may encourage them to focus on their own areas 
of core competencies instead of trying to diversify on their own to free themselves from 
resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
To maximize the positive effects of group-level diversification both in terms of 
providing critical resources and establishing an environment that incentivize the member 
firms in a positive way, business groups may follow a criterion that is different from that 
of firms to decide what industries to enter.  Hypothesis 2 suggests the strategic 
importance of an industry as a guiding principle for business group diversification.  The 
fact that it was strongly supported by the data shows that business groups are indeed 
diversifying into industries with multiple linkages with other industries.  This also 
indicates that even though business groups may look as if they diversified randomly into 
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unrelated industries, business groups are in fact strategic, given the purpose of their 
diversification.   
The statistical results also cast doubts about the explanation of business groups 
based on the notion of institutional voids.  Scholars that advocate this perspective argue 
that business groups are able to bridge institutional voids by addressing the issue of 
market failures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  To be consistent with this view, business 
groups should engage in industries that are most likely to suffer from market failures.  
However, the results show that business group industry portfolios overlap a lot in 
industries that have multiple linkages with other industries.  These industries are least 
likely to suffer from institutional voids.   
To provide further evidence for that, I ran logistic regression models that 
estimate the likelihood of a business group’s participation in each industry based on the 
same set of independent variables and controls that I used to estimate the likelihood of a 
new entry.  Table 5 presents the results based on both a single year (1999) and all the 
years (1999-2008).  It shows that the strategic impact of an industry is a very important 
factor in determining the likelihood of business groups’ presence in the industry.  The 
implication of this analysis is that certain “strategic” industries have higher 
concentrations of business groups than others.  Therefore, these strategic industries are 
not likely to suffer much from market failures.  Rather, the industries may help business 
group member firms overcome the incompleteness of strategic factor markets (Denrell et 
al., 2003) – which is the case not just for underdeveloped or emerging markets, but also 
for highly advanced economies.  Therefore, automatically dismissing the business group 
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form as a second-best option that can only work in certain underdeveloped and 
undesirable institutional settings may prevent us from seeing the value and potential of 
this unique organizational form. 
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CHAPTER IV  
BUSINESS GROUP MEMBER FIRM DIVERSIFICATION CHOICES 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter III focused on the level of business groups.  However, because a 
business group is made up of multiple legally independent firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2005), we need to consider both the group level and the firm level to grasp the business 
group’s true economic implications.  I argued in Chapter III that business groups 
diversify in order to provide their member firms with critical resources and to maximize 
the impact of a new entry, business groups choose industries with multiple linkages to 
other industries.  In this chapter, I turn my attention to the member firm and examine the 
implications of a business group’s diversification characteristics on its member firms.   
 According to Siegel and Choudhury (2012), business group member firms pursue 
more costly recombinative activities than non-member firms.  One implication of this 
finding is that the business group structure and relationships within a business group 
affect member firms’ strategies.  Therefore, it is certainly possible that even among 
business group member firms, their strategic decisions and orientations may vary based 
on the overall business group structure. 
 This chapter explores that possibility by differentiating between business-group 
level diversification and firm-level diversification, conceptualizing several relevant 
business group-level characteristics, and examining their effects on member firms’ 
diversification choices.  Focusing only on the group-level phenomena misses the fact 
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that each member firm within the group boundary may have a different organizational 
structure and strategic orientation.  On the other hand, treating each member as an 
ordinary, stand-alone firm merely with a business group membership ignores the fact 
that the member firm may form strategies based on its unique position within the 
business group under the support and constraint of the business group’s overarching 
structure. 
This chapter draws attention to the understudied fact that the business group form 
may generate economic incentives for member firms (both carrots and sticks) by posing 
structural constraints while providing resources on which member firms can draw.  Prior 
studies, even when they examine the internal mechanisms of business groups, tend to 
simply focus on how business group members can benefit from resources available 
within the group structure (Chang & Hong, 2000; Mahmood et al., 2011).  This chapter 
counterbalances it by considering the incentives arising from structural constraints as 
well as resource endowments.  By highlighting economic incentives within the business 
group, I suggest that the business group as an organizational form could be seen as an 
organizational innovation set up to satisfy the diverse and often conflicting needs of the 
controlling shareholders and other shareholders.  Thus, I argue that the business group 
could and should be viewed through a positive lens rather than in the “dark side” 
perspective that regards the business group as an organizational form that can only keep 
its relevance and advantage by bridging institutional deficiencies and exclusively benefit 
the controlling family at the expense of minority shareholders.  
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Business Group Characteristics 
Formation and growth of business groups 
Pursuing unrelated diversification by setting up a new independent legal entity 
within the boundary of the business group can be a way to avoid some of the potential 
negative effects of unrelated diversification.  The new firm will have its own 
management and organizational structure, which will at least lessen the coordinating 
costs that unrelated diversification would incur if it were undertaken within an existing 
firm.  Top management of the new firm will not have to worry about other lines of 
business within the business group (c.f., Grant et al., 1988) while having access to 
critical strategic resources through the business group network (Manikandan & 
Ramachandran, 2014).   
Moreover, because the new firm is an independent legal entity, it will have 
relatively little constraint in terms of its own market exploration and pursuit of growth 
opportunities compared with a division within a firm.  Because the expansion of scope is 
not occurring within the firm but across firms, envies and social comparisons within the 
firm will be checked (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008).  The controlling shareholders can also 
finance the new firm by devising an appropriate ownership structure for the level of risk.  
The new firm will have its own set of shareholders and stakeholders, which will make 
the firm’s goals and objectives clearer and more coherent compared with the case of 
within-firm diversification (Teece et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that if a substantial buyer-supplier relationship 
exists or is formed for the new firm and any existing firm within the group, the new firm 
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will enjoy a solid footing in the marketplace even from the beginning.  A pair of 
seemingly unrelated industries may generate a substantial amount of buyer-supplier 
transactions.  The Chapter I opening vignette about the LG group shows this clearly. The 
LG group started as a cosmetics business and expanded by sequentially establishing 
businesses that are linked by buyer-supplier relationships.14  Transactions arising from 
such relationships will not be recorded as sales and only become the matter of transfer 
pricing within a firm, but those transactions will be recognized and recorded as sales 
between two legally independent firms within the same business group because the 
business group itself is not a legal entity and the two businesses within the group are 
considered independent legal entities. 
Because of the various factors discussed above, the same degree of unrelated 
diversification may have materially different implications depending on whether it 
occurs at the level of a single firm or at the level of a business group.  This may be part 
of the reason that business groups usually start a new firm (or acquire an existing firm) 
when they pursue unrelated diversification (Chang & Choi, 1988).  As examined in 
Chapter III, the purpose of a business group’s diversification is more to provide its 
member firms with critical resources than to achieve synergies through scope 
economies.  Therefore, for the business group’s controlling shareholders, whether each 
member firm engages in an industry unrelated to one another may be less important than 
                                                 
14 Scholars regarding the business group as a coping mechanism for institutional weaknesses may argue 
that this process of diversification reflects the underdevelopment of intermediate product markets (e.g., 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  However, institutions alone cannot explain why diversification leads to the 
formation of a business group made up of multiple legally independent firms rather than a single 
multidivisional firm (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014). 
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whether each member has a transactional relationship with one another.  The 
transactional relationships are beneficial not just in terms of recorded sales, but also in 
terms of increased potential for firm-level capability development and group-level 
innovation (Mahmood et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2011). 
Diversification characteristics of business groups 
As a business group grows through both the diversification of existing member 
firms and creation or addition of new member firms, its structure becomes more 
complex and distinct structural characteristics may become more evident.  Because a 
business group is a collection of firms, each group-level characteristic may be thought of 
as an aggregation of member firms’ characteristics.  On the other hand, as the number of 
member firms increases, it is likely that each of them will develop its own unique 
characteristics, thereby increasing the degree of variations among member firms of the 
business group.  Because a business group member is placed within the business group 
boundary, the firm will be affected by the structural characteristics of the business group.  
However, this effect will be dependent upon the firm’s own unique characteristics.  
Moreover, each firm’s unique characteristics will have implications for the relationships 
among member firms within the business group as well. 
Size.  Growth of a business group obviously leads to its bigger size, whether it is 
measured by the number of total employees, assets or sales.  The size of a business 
group means the combined size of all the member firms.  This is a straightforward 
extension of numerous firm-level studies (e.g., Fong, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2009; Ito & 
Pucik, 1993; Leiblein & Madsen, 2009).  However, because this group-level construct 
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represents an aggregation, it does not capture how a business group grows – whether 
through the growth of existing member firms or through additions of new member firms 
– but only how large the member firms are collectively. 
In general, scholars propose that larger business groups can benefit from factors 
such as economies of scale (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), higher reputation in the 
marketplace (Morck et al., 2005), and political clout (Carney, 2005).  Therefore, the 
larger the size of a business group, the more group-level resources into which its 
member firms may be able to tap (Chang & Hong, 2000; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007).   
 However, the aggregative nature of group-level size belies firm-level variations.  
Business group member firms vary in size, often dramatically.  The fact that a firm is a 
member of a business group of a certain size may have a different implication based on 
the firm’s own size.  Therefore, there is a need to consider size on both levels – group 
level and firm level – in trying to gauge the implication of business group membership. 
Diversity and density.  In this chapter, diversity captures how widely diversified 
a business group is (e.g., Chang & Singh, 2000; Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2008).  Diversity is 
determined by the aggregation of the group member firms’ diversification profiles.  
Because diversity is a group-level construct, it does not capture how widely diversified 
each business group member is.  When each member of a business group specializes in a 
different business domain, group-level diversity may be high while member firms’ 
degrees of diversification are low.  On the other hand, it is possible that some member 
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firms are widely diversified while others are relatively specialized at the same group-
level diversity. 
 Density captures how close to each other member firms are in terms of their 
business domains.  My approach to density is based on the organizational ecology 
perspective (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) rather than how dense intragroup ties are as in 
the studies based on the social network theory (e.g., Mahmood et al., 2013). 
Diversity and density are related concepts, but they capture different group-level 
implications of member firms’ diversification moves.  At a given level of group-level 
diversity, the more firms there are within the boundary of the business group, the higher 
the density will be.  For example, when a member of a business group diversifies into an 
industry that has already been entered by another member, the degree of group-level 
diversity will not change because the entry will not expand the business group’s span of 
industries.  The same consequence would result from the addition of a new member that 
operates in the same industry.  However, the density within the business group will 
increase because there is now more activities within the same group-wide span of 
industries.  On the other hand, when a business group member diversifies into an 
industry that is new to the business group, the degree of group-level diversity will 
increase but that of density will hardly be affected.  
One important implication of density is that as a business group’s density 
increases, some overlaps in domain may arise among member firms.  Prior studies on 
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business groups do not discuss this possibility explicitly.15  Choi and Cowing (2002) 
note that profitable business groups in South Korea tend to expand within their existing 
domains rather than enter new markets, but their study is at the group level, so potential 
interactions among member firms that may result in a business group’s expansion within 
its existing domain are not discussed.  In fact, if business groups are studied only at one 
level, either the group or the firm level, it is inevitable that the relationships among 
group member firms are lost in translation.  Additionally, even if both levels are taken 
into account, the possibility of domain overlaps may be discounted if member firms are 
regarded as strategic business units (SBUs) rather than as mostly independent and self-
sufficient firms (e.g., Chang & Hong, 2000).  However, domain overlaps do arise in 
reality and may have significant strategic implications in terms of relationships among 
member firms and firm- and group-level efficiency.   
This possibility is particularly salient when technological innovations lead to the 
convergence of several industries.  For example, Cheil Industries, a member firm of 
Samsung Group, traditionally engaged in the production of textiles and apparels, but 
started electronic materials and parts business in 1998 to take advantage of the 
convergence of the electronics and chemical industries and to support Samsung Group’s 
thriving electronics business.  If the group’s electronics business were controlled by one 
hierarchy – i.e., Samsung Electronics, it might be overexerting for the firm to pursue 
                                                 
15 This could possibly be the consequence of implicitly equating business groups to multidivisional firms.  
For a multidivisional firm, with a unitary hierarchy, it would be hard to justify multiple divisions engaging 
in similar activities because of coordination challenges (Zhou, 2011).  However, within a business group, 
which has multiple hierarchies (firms) in its boundary, each hierarchy can choose what activities to pursue 
more or less autonomously and the issue of coordination may be alleviated because of the market-like 
nature of the business group (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014). 
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potential opportunities arising from the convergence of multiple industries.  However, 
even though Samsung Electronics is the central firm in Samsung Group’s electronics 
business, there are many other firms that support and reinforce it: Samsung Electro-
Mechanics, Samsung SDI, Samsung Techwin, and Cheil Industries among others (Lee & 
He, 2009).  Because these firms stay distinct with their own strategic approaches and 
directions while supporting the overall group’s business, their overlapping domains lead 
to cooperation and learning rather than competition and conflicts. 
Interdependence.  The case of business groups clearly demonstrates that the fact 
that a firm is legally independent may not necessarily mean it will only exist as an 
isolated and atomized entity (Granovetter, 1995; Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  
Describing a business group simply as a portfolio or collection of firms under a common 
ownership ignores the various interactions among member firms.  In this chapter, 
interdependence captures how actively member firms of a business group transact with 
one another (Jones & Hill, 1988; White, Hoskisson, Yiu, & Bruton, 2008).  When 
member firms of a business group do not transact very much with one another, they may 
be less dependent on the business group.  A higher level of intragroup transactions 
provides evidence that more and tighter linkages exist among member firms (Mahmood 
et al., 2013), which lead to greater interdependence.  I view transactional relationships 
within the group as also representing flows of information and knowledge as well as 
physical products and services (Child & McGrath, 2001).   
The controlling shareholders of a business group may intentionally set the level 
of transactional relatedness among member firms so as to form a strong, group-wide 
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value chain (Porter, 1995).  Doing so may give each member firm a unique position 
within the business group where the firm can pursue its own performance goals as well 
as contribute to the group as a whole.  Therefore, on the firm level, each member firm’s 
intragroup transactions will vary in terms of both size and direction (Chang & Hong, 
2000).  While some member firms will engage in intragroup transactions extensively, 
others may mostly transact with outside parties.  Some member firms may 
predominantly sell to other member firms, while others mainly purchase from other 
member firms. 
In the following section, I use these diversification characteristics of business 
groups to develop hypotheses about diversification choices of member firms. I argue that 
the business group constrains member firms’ choices as well as provides member firms 
with resources necessary for new market entries.  Figure 3 graphically presents the 
overall model proposed in this chapter. 
Group Member Firms’ Diversification Choices 
The diversification choices of member firms may be more straightforward to 
understand than group-level diversification because extant theories of diversification 
such as transaction cost theory and resource-based theory can be directly applied to firm-
level diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wan et al., 
2011).  Transaction cost theory explains diversification based on market imperfections 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971).  Certain activities may be more economical to perform 
within the boundary of a firm if they are prone to suffer from exchange hazards, so the 
firm will decide to diversify into the activities.  On the other hand, resource-based theory 
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suggests that diversification is a way to leverage and further develop firm-specific 
resources and capabilities (Argyres, 1996; Penrose, 1959; Silverman, 1999). 
For a member firm in a business group, in addition to firm-specific factors, the 
structural characteristics of the business group to which the firm belongs may also affect 
the member firm’s level and nature of diversification.  In other words, a member firm 
may have to consider the appropriateness of its diversification choices given such factors 
as resources available within the business group structure, the other member firms’ 
diversification profiles, and its position within the overall business group structure.   
The controlling shareholders may potentially interfere in the member’s 
diversification decisions, but such interference may be unnecessary and costly when 
structural constraints are already in place.  It may be unnecessary because the business 
group structure may provide the member’s top managers with clear economic incentives 
to make the most of its circumstances, mitigating the potential for agency problems.  It 
may be also costly because frequent interferences from the controlling shareholders may 
discourage member firm top managers from utilizing their unique insights and 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Hayek, 1945).   
Chang and Choi’s (1988) observation that South Korean business group member 
firms mostly pursue related diversification may support this logic even though their 
arguments are based on the assumption that business group member firms are like 
internal divisions of a multidivisional firm.  The observation may indicate that the 
business group member firms are conscious of the fact that they are within the 
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organizational structure larger than themselves and they do not have to diversify into 
unrelated areas that are already covered by the overall business group structure.   
Business group size and firm diversification   
According to resource-based theory, a firm needs resources to diversify and the 
availability, quality and management of its firm-specific resources constrain the firm’s 
diversification choices (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  However, business group member firms, unlike stand-alone firms, 
can also tap into group-wide resources in addition to their own firm-specific resources 
when they decide to diversify into new industries.   
Even though the resource-based theory was originally developed for completely 
independent and autonomous firms (Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008), most scholars 
approaching business groups using resource-based theory have focused on group-level 
resources rather than firm-level resources.  This approach reflects the view that 
institutional weaknesses foster the formation of business groups by making ‘generalized’ 
resources and capabilities valuable (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Guillén, 2000; Yiu et 
al., 2005).  In addition to such generalized group-level resources, the business group 
structure may promote cooperative behaviors based on mutual trust, giving member 
firms access to various resources residing within other member firms’ boundaries 
(Chang & Hong, 2000; Kim & Hoskisson, 1996).  The size of a business group may 
signify the size of the knowledge and resource repository that a member can draw on to 
make a new industry entry more feasible.  Therefore, a member firm in a large business 
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group will be more likely to diversify into a new industry than a member of a small 
business group. 
Hypothesis 4a. The larger the size of the business group, the more likely is a 
member firm to enter an industry new to the firm.   
The size of a business group, however, may have a different impact on each 
member firm based on its own size relative to that of other member firms.  If one 
member firm of a business group is much larger than the other member firms, the 
dominant member firm may not enjoy a group-wide resource pool much bigger than its 
own even if the business group itself is large.  On the other hand, the other member firms 
may benefit significantly more from having a large member within the business group.16  
A business group is essentially a social network privately owned by the controlling 
shareholders (Chang, 1999).  In an ordinary network structure, poorly embedded firms 
often pay hefty prices to build ties with highly embedded firms (Ahuja, Polidoro, & 
Mitchell, 2009).  A small firm in a large business group, just by being its member firm, 
is automatically embedded in a network, which allows the firm to access a resource pool 
much larger than its own.  Therefore, the effect of group size will be larger for smaller 
member firms than for larger ones. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4b. The relative size of a business group member moderates the 
positive relationship between the size of a business group and the member’s new 
                                                 
16 A similar logic can be found in the international trade literature regarding the size of countries in the 
context of regional free trade agreement (Alesina, Spolaore, & Wacziarg, 2005). 
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industry entry such that the larger the member’s size, the weaker is the 
relationship.  
Business group diversity and member firm diversification 
 As the diversity of industries represented in the business group increases, 
member firms will be able to access an increasingly more diverse sets of tangible and 
intangible resources through intragroup factor markets (Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006).  
For example, according to Lamin (2013), Indian information services firms that are 
business group member firms can serve more diverse industries and markets than stand-
alone firms by tapping into the group-wide knowledge and social capital.  She finds that 
this role of the business group as an information source becomes more substantial as the 
group-level diversification increases.  In general, this implies that business group 
member firms will be able to focus on their core activities and capabilities without 
worrying about building resources extraneous to them.   
Moreover, mutual trust among member firms within the business group may 
lessen the need to seek for economies of scale from internalizing transactions through 
vertical integration (Williamson, 1991).  A business group member firm may suffer less 
from high transaction costs than a stand-alone firm in the same situation thanks to trust 
and shared values with other member firms within the group.  Therefore, as the diversity 
of a business group increases, a member firm will be less likely to enter a new industry. 
Hypothesis 5. The more diversified is a business group, the less likely it is for a 
member firm to enter an industry new to the firm. 
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Related diversification and intensifying density 
Perhaps the more important issue regarding a business group member firm’s 
diversification than the likelihood of diversification in general would be whether the 
firm is likely to pursue related diversification or unrelated diversification.   
Risk reduction based on portfolio theory is regarded as a major advantage of 
unrelated diversification (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989).  Diversifying into an 
unrelated industry may be tempting to the firm’s managers because it may be able to 
maintain relatively stable performance should one of its industry domains suffer from 
industry-specific circumstances; unrelated diversification would decrease the firm’s 
bankruptcy risk and the managers’ employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). “Not 
having all one’s eggs in one basket” as a motive for unrelated diversification is regarded 
as one of the most important agency problems for the corporate governance structure to 
deal with (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Martin & Sayrak, 2003; 
Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989).   
 However, for top managers of a business group member firm, it may be more 
difficult to justify an entry into an industry that is not closely related to the firm’s 
existing industry portfolio especially when the business group is of a substantial size, 
because ample group-level resources may provide the firm with a buffer against short-
term jolts (Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, 2006).  Moreover, the employment risk of 
managers of business group member firms may be less sensitive to industry-specific 
shocks than that of managers of stand-alone firms because the controlling shareholders 
may regard a member firm’s contribution to the entire group more important than its 
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short-term fluctuations in performance (Kato, Kim, & Lee, 2007). 17 Therefore, the 
increasing resource support coming from the size of the business group is likely to result 
in a member firm’s entries into related industries rather than unrelated ones. 
The diversity of a business group’s industry portfolio will also help prevent 
managers of a member firm from diversifying into an industry unrelated to the firm’s 
own industry portfolio because the coinsurance effect (Berger & Ofek, 1995) that 
unrelated diversification is intended to accomplish may already be available through the 
business group structure.  As the diversity of a business group increases, the risk 
reduction effect based on portfolio theory will become more salient at the group level.  
Therefore, it will be more difficult for top managers of a member firm to convince the 
controlling shareholders about a need for unrelated diversification of its own.  
As the need to consider various diversification options decreases because of the 
presence of other member firms within the business group, a substantial amount of 
managerial cognitive resources of the member firm may be freed up (Aghion & Tirole, 
1995; Mahnke, Venzin, & Zahra, 2007; Schwenk, 1984).  Specializing in certain 
activities while giving up others may result in significant cost savings for each member 
firm (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Miller, Zhao, & Calantone, 2006).  At the same 
time, by being a member of the group, the firm may be able to minimize the degree of 
                                                 
17 Campbell and Keys (2002) found no relationship between firm performance and top executive turnover 
for top executives of top five business groups in South Korea based on data from 1992 to 1997.  Kato, 
Kim, and Lee (2007), based on data from 1998 to 2001, showed executive pay was not sensitive to firm 
performance for top executives of firms belonging to top 30 business groups.  These authors blame weak 
corporate governance for their findings, but it may be possible that the nature of group structure 
contributed to the findings. Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle’s (2006) finding that member firms belonging to 
the business group’s core business is more strongly supported than others insinuates the importance of 
considering the overall group structure as well as individual firms.  
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hazards accompanying outsourcing (Dyer & Chu, 2010).  Therefore, the firm will be 
able to devote more of its firm-specific resources into further development and 
innovation in its existing industry portfolio.  As this leads to cost savings and allows new 
resource and capability development, the firm will be able to form a strong resource base 
to diversify into closely related industries (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991).  Therefore, 
business group member firms are likely to diversify into an industry that is closely 
related to its existing industry portfolio. 
Hypothesis 6a. A business group member firm is more likely to enter a new 
industry that is related to the firm’s existing industry portfolio. 
The fact that there are two different levels of diversification in the business group 
structure – firm and group – opens up another diversification possibility to a business 
group member: entering an industry in which other member firms are already operating 
not for competition, but for cooperation.   
A business group member firm may have preferential access to distinct 
information, knowledge, and capabilities of other member firms of the business group 
(Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014).  The firm will be able to understand and evaluate 
its own resources and capabilities in connection with those that are available through the 
business group structure, which may help the firm identify strategic opportunities that 
are hidden due to the incompleteness of strategic factor markets (Denrell et al., 2003).  
When the firm understands the connection between its own resource portfolio and an 
industry in which another member firm of the same business group engages, the firm 
will have an incentive to enter the industry to pursue the identified strategic opportunity. 
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Mutual trust among business group member firms may enable them to share 
knowledge and information accumulated within their own boundary more freely with 
other member firms because the usual tension between knowledge sharing and 
protection (Kale & Singh, 2009; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Zhao, 2006) may be 
minimized among member firms of a same business group.  In other words, the business 
group form may be an ideal structure to govern alliance relationships among member 
firms.  In normal situation, when alliance relationships become more complicated as in 
the case of multilateral research and development (R&D) alliances, more rigid 
governance structures based on equity are commonly utilized (Li, Eden, Hitt, Ireland, & 
Garrett, 2012).  A business group may be able to handle the governance of complex 
relationships of multiple multilateral alliances without rigid structures, promoting the 
intragroup development and sharing of new knowledge and knowhow.  Therefore, a 
business in which other member firms are already operating may be an attractive entry 
target for a business group member firm.   
Over time, this will lead to an increasing level of density, decreasing the distance 
among the member firms in terms of their business domains within the business group 
boundary.  One important implication of the deepening density of a business group is 
that it may alleviate a serious coordination issue that is faced by stand-alone firms when 
they pursue related diversification.  The pursuit of synergy arising from related 
diversification may be limited by costs of coordinating complex interdependencies 
within a single firm (Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011).  The structure of business groups may 
provide an ideal environment for managing such interdependencies to member firms by 
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engaging multiple firms in an industry and making sure that they stay cooperative to 
yield synergies while minimizing coordination costs.  
Hypothesis 6b. A business group member firm is more likely to enter a new 
industry in which other member firms already operate. 
Interdependence 
Transactions within the business group boundary may provide member firms 
with more direct benefits than mere membership or potential access to group-wide 
resources (Chang & Hong, 2000).   
From the perspective of transaction cost theory, a business group member is in an 
interesting hybrid position (Williamson, 1991).  When the member firm transacts with 
other member firms within the group, the firm faces few exchange hazards, if any, 
thanks to formal and/or informal ties among them (Granovetter, 1995).  However, when 
the affiliate transacts with parties outside the group, the affiliate may face the same level 
of exchange hazards as ordinary firms do.   
 The existence of intragroup transactions indicates that member firms are tapping 
into strategic factor markets inside the business group and providing intermediate goods 
and services to other member firms (Chang & Hong, 2000).  Member firms will be able 
to save transaction costs substantially thanks to mutual trust formed within the business 
group (Williamson, 1991).  Therefore, the more they depend on other member firms for 
intermediate goods or services, the more they may be able to focus on matters other than 
transactional hazards.   
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In essence, when interdependence among members of a business group is high, 
members may have less need to diversify widely to gain access to a new source of 
knowledge or resources because they will get access to market information and 
knowledge that would be normally kept within their transaction partners in the case of 
market transactions (Adler, 2001).  Moreover, a stronger overall interdependence among 
business group members may make it more important for a member firm to consider the 
circumstances of other members (Granovetter, 1995; Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  
This may make a firm think twice before deciding to enter a new business. 
Hypothesis 7. The higher the overall level of transactions within a business 
group, the less likely is a member firm to enter an industry new to the firm. 
Data and Methods 
I test the hypotheses in this chapter using the industry participation and entry data 
of listed non-financial member firms of 30 major South Korean business groups from 
1998 to 2008.  The unit of analysis is firm year for each industry.  The sample used in 
this chapter includes 108 business group member firms.  If all these firms are present 
throughout the study period, the number of observation would be 83,160 because there 
are 77 industry categories and the data cover a 10-year span.  However, firms each 
previous year are already operating in some industries, which are excluded from the 
analyses.  Additionally, some firms are present in only certain years in the sample and 
there are some missing data.  In the end, the number of observations used in the main 
data analyses in this chapter is 59,723.  The description of business group data and 
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industry data that are used in this chapter and the sources of the data are available in the 
previous chapter.   
I used only publicly listed business group member firms in my analyses because 
they fit the purpose of this dissertation.  First, the theoretical development of this 
dissertation is based on the assumption that the business group controlling shareholders 
do not have to control every aspect of every business in which the business group 
engages and that business group member firms are encouraged to exercise a substantial 
degree of autonomy.  For firms that are privately owned by the controlling shareholders, 
this assumption may not hold.  The strategic decisions of privately-owned member firms 
may reflect the controlling shareholders’ intentions rather than the firms’ adaptation to 
the business group environment.   
Second, the degree of a firm’s diversification (whether the diversification is 
related or unrelated) has often been scrutinized out of the concern for agency issues 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Given that the primary concern for 
the business group form arises because of the potential that the controlling shareholders 
may show opportunistic behaviors that may sacrifice the interest of minority 
shareholders, privately-owned business group member firms are not very relevant targets 
to focus on in terms of corporate governance.  Indeed, in the field of finance, a business 
group is typically defined as “two or more listed firms under a common controlling 
shareholder” (Morck, 2010: 603). 
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Variables 
  Dependent variable.  Entry (ENTRYijt) is a dummy variable indicating whether 
firm i entered industry j in year t.  Annual data on firms’ business portfolios and new 
entries were collected from the firms’ annual reports available on the DART system. 
Independent variables.  The core independent variable to test Hypothesis 4a and 
Hypothesis 4b is business group size.  The size of a business group is measured as the 
logarithm of business group total assets.18  For the test of Hypothesis 4b, I use the 
logarithm of each member firm’s total assets as the proxy for firm size and add an 
interaction term between business group size and member firm size.   
Hypothesis 5 tests whether the diversity of a business group’s industry portfolio 
affects its member firms’ diversification pattern.  The diversity is measured as the count 
of industries in which the business group engages.  As in the previous chapter, I use 
residuals after regressing count of industries on logged business group total assets to 
eliminate the size effect that may dominate the count of industries and minimize 
potential problems associated with multicollinearity. 
The independent variable for Hypothesis 6a is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the focal business group member firm operated in an industry related to the 
focal industry (yes = 1). As in analyses presented in the previous chapter, I used the 
South Korean input-output table’s 28 broader categorization of industries to determine 
                                                 
18 I used total assets here because I use a variable (level of within group transaction) based on total sales 
and this variable may lead to a spurious regression result in combination with the total sales variable 
(Wiseman, 2009).  I also tested using the logarithm of total sales to proxy business group size.  As in the 
previous Chapter, the results were similar reflecting the close correlation of the two variables. 
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the relatedness between industries.  The independent variable for Hypothesis 6b is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether another firm of the business group to which the 
focal firm belongs already operated in the focal industry. The presence of other business 
group member firms in the focal industry is measured as a dummy variable (presence = 
1). 
For the test of Hypothesis 7, the level of within-group transactions is measured 
by the percentage of within-group sales in total business group sales.  The within-group 
transaction data are from the KFTC’s large scale business group database.   
Control variables.  Many control variables are included in the empirical tests.  I 
add these variables to control firm effect, business group effect, industry effect, and year 
effect.  Firm control variables include age, profitability (earnings before interest and 
tax), research and development (R&D) intensity, and scope of business (count of the 
industries in which the firm is present).19   
A firm’s age is an important factor in its diversification pattern because firms go 
through different stages throughout their life span, which affects their rate of growth and 
the pattern of their strategies (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; Miller & Friesen, 
1984).  Profitability may lead either to more diversification through the increase in slack 
resources (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1988) or to less diversification because it may 
indicate that the firm’s potential in its current markets is positive (Hoskisson & Hitt, 
                                                 
19 A firm’s level of cash holdings is also an important factor in its corporate diversification because the 
firm’s cash may serve as the most fungible slack resource for the diversifying firm (Jensen, 1986; 
Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1988).  On the other hand, widely diversified firms may hold less cash because 
they can spread risk across different businesses (Duchin, 2010; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 
1999).  However, the logged form of this variable showed an extreme level of correlation with total assets 
(r = 0.81), so I did not include the control variable in the models. 
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1990).  R&D intensity has been found to be significantly related to a firm’s 
diversification patterns (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989).  Finally, the existing scope of 
the firm may indicate the tendency of the firm’s attitude and approach to diversification, 
but the existing scope may also constrain the firm’s capability to pursue further 
diversification.  I transformed the variable into the logarithm form by taking natural log 
after making all the values positive. 
As business group control variables, I include the number of member firms, 
business group age, and group-wide profit.  Group-wide profit may affect the likelihood 
of firm diversification either positively through the provision of free cash flow through 
internal capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b) or negatively because of strategic 
inertia.  The group-wide profit data are from the KFTC’s database of major large scale 
business groups.  The number of member firms and group-wide profit were adjusted to 
be independent from business group size following the same method employed in the 
previous chapter.  For group-wide profit, I used the logarithmic transformation to make 
the distribution closer to normal. 
I also included industry controls: size, strategic impact, and growth rate.  I 
expected the bigger the industry, the more likely it is for a firm to enter.  Firms may also 
prefer strategically important industries that have many linkages with other industries 
than isolated industries.  Additionally, I expected the growth rate of an industry to 
positively affect the likelihood of a firm’s entry.  The size and growth rate of an industry 
was measured based on the total production value of the industry, based on data 
available from the Bank of Korea.   
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In addition, I control for the annual growth rate of South Korean GDP to account 
for yearly fluctuation in national economic activities.  All of the independent variables 
and control variables are lagged one year.  Table 6 lists the variables and presents their 
definition and basic descriptive statistics.  Table 7 shows pairwise correlations among 
the variables. 
Statistical methods 
For all of the hypotheses, the probability that a particular firm enters a particular 
industry in which it did not previously operate in a particular year is estimated.  
Therefore, logistic regression models are used to estimate the probabilities in question.  
As in Chapter III, I use two alternative statistical models to deal with the uniqueness of 
the dataset: multilevel logistic regression to account for the nested structure of the data 
(industries nested in firms) and Perth logistic regression (Firth, 1993) to deal with the 
fact that a firm’s entry to a new industry is a rare event (Heinze & Schemper, 2002).  In 
the sample, among 59,753 total observations, there were 73 cases of entry, which 
constitute approximately 0.12 percent of all the observations. 
Results 
Table 8 presents the results of hypothesis tests.  Column (1) shows the logistic 
regression model with only the control variables.  The coefficient for firm age is 
negative and statistically significant, showing that older firms are less active in terms of 
new industry entries.  The coefficient for firm scope is positive and highly statistically 
significant.  This may imply that firms have the tendency to keep diversifying once they 
start diversifying.  These two control variables remain statistically significant across all 
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the different models.  On the other hand, strategic importance of an industry is positive 
and highly statistically significant in predicting the likelihood of firm entry to the 
industry in the control-only model, but it loses statistical significance once the variable 
indicating another business group member firm’s presence in the industry is added to the 
model. 
I examined the VIFs to check the potential multicollinarity issue using the 
ordinary least squares regression model equivalent to the model shown in column (6) 
(Hitt et al., 2006).  Size of business group (measured by logged business group total 
assets) had the highest VIF (3.81) and the mean VIF was 1.74, which alleviate concerns 
of potential multicollinearity.  Some of the pairwise correlation coefficients are high.  
The highest pairwise correlation is 0.59 between business group size and the level of 
within-group transaction.  However, this figure is still well below the threshold 
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2012).  
 I sequentially added each of the independent variables to see the stability of the 
overall model.  Columns (2) to (6) show that the coefficients are largely stable 
throughout this process.20  Except for the model in Column (2), the fit of every model 
shows a statistically significant improvement based on Bayesian Information Criterion. 
                                                 
20 The group size variable approaches statistical significant at 95% confidence level with a negative 
coefficient when the variable indicating the presence of a business group member firm in the given 
industry, but the group size variable loses any significance when the interdependence variable is added.  
This may be due to high correlations among these three variables.  Given the high correlation between 
business group size and the interdependence variable, I also tested a model with the size-adjusted 
interdependence variable, using the same technique that I used in Chapter III.  In this model, the 
coefficient of the group size variable was negative and significant at 90% confidence level.  In any case, 
these results do not support Hypothesis 4a. 
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Column (6) of Table 8 shows the result of the logistic regression analysis with all 
of the independent variables and control variables.  Columns (7) and (8) show the results 
of the multilevel logistic regression and the Firth logistic regression, respectively.  There 
are some differences, but all three analyses yielded largely comparable results.  
Therefore, I will simply refer to the result outlined in column (6) when I discuss the 
specific hypothesis testing results. 
 Hypothesis 4a predicted that a business group’s size would be positive in the 
likelihood of its member firms’ entry into a new industry.  However, the coefficient for 
group size is negative and non-significant (p = 0.57).  Therefore, Hypothesis 4a is not 
supported.  Because the main relationship does not hold, Hypothesis 4b is also not 
supported.   
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that as the level of business group diversification goes up, 
the member firm’s incentive to diversify will diminish.  The coefficient for group 
diversity is negative and highly statistically significant (p < 0.01), providing support for 
the hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 6a predicted that business group member firms would tend to 
diversify into industries to which their existing business portfolio is related.  The 
coefficient for the dummy variable indicating the firm’s presence in related industries is 
positive and highly statistically significant (p < 0.01), which supports the hypothesis.  
On the other hand, Hypothesis 6b predicted that business group member firms would 
have the tendency to diversify into industries in which other firms within the group are 
already operate.  The coefficient for the dummy variable indicating a business group 
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sister firm’s presence in the focal industry is positive and highly statistically significant 
(p < 0.01), lending support to the hypothesis.   
 Hypothesis 7 predicted that interdependence among business group member 
firms that is evidenced by the level of within-group transactions would lead to a lower 
likelihood of the member firm’s entry to a new industry.  The coefficient for 
interdependence is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05), supporting the 
hypothesis. 
 As Table 8 shows, Hypotheses 5 through 7 are supported in the alternative 
modeling approaches as well.  
Discussion 
 In Chapter III, I argued that the purpose of business group diversification is 
different from that of firm diversification.  I suggested that because a business group 
forms a special marketplace where its member firms can transact with one another with 
trust, the controlling shareholders of the business group would try to maximize the 
impact of the entry to an additional industry by targeting industries that have linkages 
with many other industries.  Empirical tests of the idea clearly showed that major Korean 
business groups tend to make new entries to such strategically impactful industries.  By 
entering those industries and operating in them, a business group can have the widest 
possible coverage of the entire national economy at a given level of diversification.  
 Based on the aforementioned idea, this chapter explored implications of the idea 
for business group member firms, which are at once legally independent entities and 
constituents of the special marketplace represented by the business group.  As has been 
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already noted, prior research has routinely used a membership to any business group to 
assess economic consequences of a business group by examining the performance 
difference between business group member firms and stand-alone firms (e.g., Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a, b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001).  This approach takes account of the fact that 
a business group member firm is independent despite its membership to the business 
group, but do not consider anything about the characteristics of the special marketplace 
in which the firm operates.  As the firm may draw various benefits from this 
marketplace, the firm will be certainly motivated to maximize the benefits arising from 
business group membership.  Such motivation will affect a variety of strategic decisions 
of the firm.  In this chapter, I specifically focused on business group member firms’ 
diversification and argued that the characteristics of the business group to which a firm 
belongs affect its diversification pattern. 
 Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b, which focused on the effect of business group 
size on member firm diversification likelihood, did not get any empirical support.  The 
results may show that simply having a bigger marketplace in the form of a larger 
business group may not have an effect (positive or negative) on a member firm’s 
diversification pattern even though business group size may provide member firms with 
various advantages (Carney, 2004; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). 
The strong empirical support for Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 7, which focus on 
the degree of diversification and the level of intragroup transaction respectively, further 
undergirds this conclusion.  The empirical support of Hypothesis 5 suggests that the 
controlling shareholders of a business group can induce its member firms to focus on 
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their core activities by expanding the industry coverage of the business group as a whole.  
The empirical support of Hypothesis 7 suggests that by designing the overall structure of 
a business group so that more transactions may occur within the boundary of the 
business group, the controlling shareholders will be able to encourage the member firms 
to focus.  In other words, the empirical supports for these two hypotheses suggest that no 
matter how large a business group may be, if it is not designed and managed optimally, 
it may not constrain its member firms’ diversification.  On the flip side, the results 
insinuate that the controlling shareholders may not need to try to manage member firms 
directly or force them to pursue the collective interest of the business group because the 
controlling shareholders may be able to affect the firms’ strategic patterns simply by 
defining specific characteristics of the overall business group.   
Hypothesis 6a and Hypothesis 6b are not directly about the effect of business 
group characteristics, but they provide some of the reasons that we should not approach 
business group diversification only at either the member firm level or the business group 
level.   
The empirical support for Hypothesis 6a shows that at least at the firm level, the 
argument that business groups tend to diversify excessively into unrelated industries is 
misplaced.  As legally independent entities, business group firms are likely to enter an 
industry that is related to their existing industry portfolio, following the relatedness 
criterion (Rumelt, 1974).  Even though I only used business group member firms for 
empirical tests, the theory laid out in this dissertation suggests that business group 
member firms may have less need for diversifying widely than stand-alone firms 
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because group member firms may access various resources embedded not just within 
their boundaries but also within the overall business group boundary to which they 
belong (Lamin, 2013; Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014). 
In particular, the empirical support for Hypothesis 6b leads to a highly interesting 
implication.  The hypothesis deals with the fact that multiple business group members 
often participate in the same industry complementing one another’s business and 
cooperating with one another (Choi & Cowing, 2002; Lee & He, 2009).  Even though 
this phenomenon is pretty common in major business groups, previous research that 
either focuses on the firm level or the business group level could not deal with the 
possibility of industry domain overlap.  In firm-level studies, what other member firms 
do within the boundary of the same business groups is mostly ignored.  Even when 
specific business groups to which the firms belong are considered, business group 
variables are typically aggregated (e.g., Chang & Hong, 2000), which hinders the 
examination of the activities of specific firms within a business group.  In business 
group-level studies, diversification has been commonly examined only on the dimension 
of breadth of industry portfolio simulating firm-level diversification studies, so any 
overlap has been ignored. 
Industry overlaps among business group member firms may lead to close 
collaborations and intensive knowledge sharing rather than intense competition with one 
another.  Given that one of the most important characteristics of the business group form 
is trust arising from informal ties, which are often family-based, the role of the business 
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group form in facilitating complex multilateral alliances among member firms without 
elaborate governance mechanisms may need to be highlighted (Li et al., 2012). 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation, I put forth the idea that business groups diversify for reasons 
that are different from those of firms.  I emphasized business groups’ market-like nature 
and argued that the controlling shareholders of a business group would want the 
maximum coverage of the entire economy at a given level of diversification by entering 
strategic industries that have linkages to many other industries.  In turn, business group 
member firms, as legally independent entities, will base their diversification decisions on 
the characteristics of the business group to which they belong, so that they may reap the 
maximum benefit of membership.  I argued that as a business group becomes more 
diversified and its level of intragroup transactions goes up, its member firms will be less 
likely to pursue wide diversification of their own.  Additionally, I proposed that business 
group member firms will follow the relatedness criterion but they will also use the 
criterion not just in connection to their own industry portfolio, but also in relation to the 
portfolios of other member firms within the same business group.  I found empirical 
support for a majority of my hypotheses using the data of 30 major Korean business 
groups and their 108 member firms.  Table 9 summarizes the results of the empirical 
testing in this dissertation. 
Implications 
My findings clearly indicate the need to examine the business group in a way that 
takes account of both of its double boundaries (Granovetter, 1995).   
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Most previous studies of business groups tend to focus on their member firms as 
units of analysis because business groups have been regarded as anomalies that cannot 
be explained neatly based on existing firm-based theories (Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 
2008).  Therefore, business group membership has often been reduced to a firm-level 
dummy variable that simply captures whether the firm is a business group member firm 
or not.   
The business group homogeneity assumption that underlies this approach is 
much like the firm homogeneity assumption that the field of strategic management has 
helped to overcome with the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  
Given the complexity of the business group structure and the increasing importance of 
the business group form in the world economy, it is important to overcome this 
unrealistic and constraining assumption and explore this organizational form in a way 
that considers its unique purposes.   
By showing that business groups follow a diversification criterion that is 
different from that of firms, this dissertation sheds light on one such unique purpose: 
expanding its provision of strategic resources to member firms.  As a multi-firm 
organization, the business group is uniquely suited to take advantage of the inherent 
linkages among diverse industries.  As technological innovation leads to an increasing 
level of industry convergence (Benner & Tripsas, 2012), the incompleteness of strategic 
factor markets (Denrell et al., 2003) may increasingly reward the business group’s 
capability to provide its member firms with potential growth opportunities through 
combining their own resources with resources available through fellow member firms 
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(Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014; Lamin, 2013).  When we consider market 
imperfection in general rather than market imperfection that is specific to a certain 
institutional environment, we realize that the business group form may actually be highly 
relevant to today’s changing economic landscape characterized by technological 
innovations and industry convergences. 
Taking account of the market-like nature of the business group also lead to the 
realization that for the member firms of the business group, it is a special environment to 
which they need to adjust.  This environment may be considered as a type of institution 
and institutional theory suggests that the member firms will form their strategic 
directions in consideration of this institution.  If diversification behavior is different 
across countries because of different national institutions as suggested by Kogut, 
Walker, and Anand (2002), it is reasonable to expect that member firms to different 
business groups would display different diversification behaviors.  The findings in this 
dissertation clearly show that the structure of the business group affects its member 
firms’ choices in diversification.    
Viewing the business group not just as a resource provider but also as an 
environment that may define its member firms’ strategic directions has an implication 
for both the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  For the controlling 
shareholders, it means they can encourage individual member firms to focus on and 
improve their core activities by providing the widest coverage of the entire economy at a 
given diversification level of the business group.  By showing that business groups target 
industries with multiple linkages for diversification, this dissertation supports the idea 
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that the wide diversification of the business group may be purposeful and strategic rather 
than haphazard and opportunistic.   
For minority shareholders, the tendency of business group member firms to focus 
on their core activities rather than diversify widely into unrelated industries is welcome 
because minority shareholders can easily diversify their investment portfolio.  Along 
with the potential growth opportunities arising from the diverse strategic resources 
available within the business group boundary (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014), 
this tendency may be an important factor that draws minority shareholders to invest in 
business group member firms rather than shun away from them worrying about potential 
opportunistic behaviors of the controlling shareholders. 
Overall, this dissertation shows the positive potential of the business group.  I 
suspect business groups are going to further grow and prosper rather than wither away.  
In light of the potential, I believe we need to worry more about how to level the playing 
field for stand-alone firms rather than about how antiquated and dysfunctional business 
groups are.  Business groups are already dominating many national economies across the 
world.  Some of them are already global players and have the potential to exert 
increasing influence on the world economy as a whole. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
This dissertation only touches a tiny piece of the potential effects of the business 
group, but still suffers from some limitations.   
First, in this dissertation, a business group’s diversification through the creation 
or addition of a new firm is considered simply as changes to the business group’s 
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structural characteristics through which group member firms may potentially be affected.  
In reality, this form of diversification may directly affect certain member firms because 
in some cases, new firms are created through reorganizations of other member firms 
within the group. 
Second, if data are available, intragroup transactional relationships may be 
analyzed based on specific transactions among member firms rather than on the 
aggregated sale and purchase amounts across all the member firms.  Examining specific 
transactional relationships will help identify different types of relationships possible 
among member firms within the business group by detecting the direction of transactions 
and the number of intragroup transaction partners. 
Third, the empirical tests of the ideas in this dissertation are based only on a 
limited number of major business groups and their member firms in just one country.  
Business groups are very diverse across countries, so the generalizability of the 
empirical results may be at issue.  Even though several recent studies of Indian business 
groups (Manikandan & Ramachandran, 2014; Lamin, 2013; Siegel & Choudhury, 2012) 
provide some indirect indication that the logic that this dissertation proposes can be 
applied to business groups in other countries, studies of business groups from more 
countries will obviously help strengthen the empirical support of the ideas. 
The business group effect, which has been commonly reduced to a single dummy 
variable in prior empirical studies, may be much more substantial and varied than what 
has been presented in this dissertation, which has focused only on the product 
diversification pattern of a business group and how it may affect firm-level product 
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diversification decisions.  Therefore, future studies may explore the business group 
effect in many other settings. 
An obvious opportunity to extend the logic I propose in this dissertation lies in 
the topic of international diversification, which the dissertation does not cover.  The 
international diversification of a business group may be approached in a manner that is 
similar to that of this dissertation.  Specifically, we can examine the overall business 
group level international diversification as well as each business group’s international 
diversification pattern, which is likely to be influenced by the group level international 
diversification through potential factors such as resource endowments, exchanges of 
information and knowledge, and opportunities for cooperation and alliance with other 
member firms within the business group.  This inquiry will also provide research 
insights for emerging market multinational enterprises, most of which are member firms 
of business groups (Hoskisson, Kim, White, & Tihanyi, 2004).   
One other issue that should be considered in future studies is a divergence in 
performance at two different levels (group-level and firm-level) and its impact on 
member firms’ diversification choices.  Scholars note that poor performance may lead to 
a firm’s diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990).  In the business group setting, a 
member firm may be affected not only by its own performance but also by the collective 
performance of the group.  Moreover, each member of the group may display a different 
sensitivity to group-wide performance in forming its own strategy based on the firm’s 
unique position and characteristics within the business group. 
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Also important to consider in future work on business groups are group-level 
competitive dynamics.  It is noted that competition occurs not only among firms, but 
also among groups of firms (Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Heugens & Zyglidopoulos, 2008).  
It would be interesting to ask whether the rivalry among two business groups would 
affect firm-level strategic decisions and firm-level competitive dynamics. 
Finally, the fact that most business groups are family-controlled compels us to 
ask fundamental questions about the underpinning of the business group form.  Most 
large firms in many national economies belong to business groups controlled by families 
(La Porta et al., 1999).  Most families run a portfolio of firms rather than just a single 
firm (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2011).  What factors drive the decision to 
form a business group?  What makes family so advantageous in forming a business 
group?  Why do families tend to diversify by forming a business group rather than by 
adding divisions within a firm?  These are largely unanswered research questions that 
need to be explored. 
Scholars that emphasize the notion of socioemotional wealth have argued that 
family firms diversify less than non-family firms (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De 
Castro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  The 
scholars argue that families do not want to lose their socioemotional wealth by getting 
too far away from their core business domain.  However, if the business group is a 
typical way for a family to diversify into many different industries, can we still say that 
family businesses tend not to diversify widely?  The empirical studies of family firm 
diversification have largely ignored the presence of business groups.  We may need to 
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reexamine the validity of this line of research by taking account of family businesses 
diversifying through the business group formation.   
Concluding Remarks 
 This dissertation suggests a new perspective on business group diversification by 
examining it at two different levels: the business group level and the member firm level.  
For the business group level, I proposed that the purpose of group-level diversification 
should be different from that of firm-level diversification given the business group’s 
market-like nature.  For the member firm level, I emphasized the fact that business group 
member firms are both supported and constrained in making their diversification 
decisions by the characteristics of the business group to which they belong.   
My perspective reveals an important weakness in prior research, which simply 
considers business group membership as the only difference between business group 
member firms and non-member firms.  Whether business group member firms are 
efficient cannot be determined simply by making comparisons with non-member firms 
because business group member firms’ strategic decisions are affected by the 
opportunities and constraints that arise from their business group membership, which 
cannot be reduced to a single dummy variable. 
The wide diversification of a business group, unlike that of a firm, may not be so 
negative after all.  It may act as a kind of governance device for its member firms by 
making them focus on their core activities and developing them further rather than 
diversify widely on their own.  The structure of a business group may determine how 
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much autonomy its member firms have, how cooperative they are, and how 
economically productive the overall group becomes. 
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Two levels of boundaries of a business group 
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FIGURE 2. Model for business group diversification 
 
 
 124 
 
FIGURE 3. Model for business group member firm diversification 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES 
 
TABLE 1. Top 30 business groups in Korean economy (in 10 billion Korean Won) 
 
Year 
South Korean 
GDP 
Total Assets of 
Top 30 Groups 
Percentage 
Total Sales of 
Top 30 Groups 
Percentage 
1999 549,005 411,664 74.98 403,333 73.47 
2000 635,185 437,868 68.94 510,108 80.31 
2001 688,165 396,510 57.62 489,195 71.09 
2002 761,939 451,776 59.29 547,827 71.90 
2003 810,915 467,373 57.64 476,273 58.73 
2004 876,033 510,914 58.32 560,661 64.00 
2005 919,797 586,660 63.78 629,387 68.43 
2006 966,055 654,712 67.77 674,238 69.79 
2007 1,043,258 754,117 72.28 742,744 71.19 
2008 1,104,492 931,619 84.35 939,620 85.07 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variables Definition Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Business group variables      
Total asset Total assets of business group 17,645.72 23,865.22 1,099.00 144,449.50 
 Logarithm of total asset 9.14 1.06 7.00 11.88 
Sales Total sales of business group 20,027.84 31,108.83 1,412.00 160,658.00 
 Logarithm of sales 9.12 1.15 7.25 11.99 
Profit Group-wide profit 855.28 2,142.71 -7,191.32 13,274.17 
 Logarithm of group-wide profit 8.94 0.64 -0.38 9.93 
 Size-adjusted logarithm of group-wide profit 0.00 0.63 -9.45 0.80 
Age Years from founding 41.18 25.38 1.00 112.00 
Scope Count of industries in business group 16.91 6.64 5.00 35.00 
 Size-adjusted count of industries in business group 0.00 4.95 -15.00 11.00 
Member firms Count of member firms 24.42 14.63 6.00 66.00 
 Size-adjusted count of member firms 0.00 10.96 -28.00 40.33 
      
Industry variables      
Industry size Total production value of industry 26,400,000 26,600,000 725,482 132,000,000 
 Logarithm of total production value of industry 16.57 1.08 13.49 18.70 
Industry growth rate Annual growth rate of industry 0.08 0.06 -0.16 0.47 
Strategic impact Number of related industries 9.73 13.55 0.00 75.00 
Relatedness  Presence of a related industry within business group 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
      
Year variable      
GDP growth Annual GDP growth rate 5.48 4.68 -5.70 15.70 
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TABLE 3. Correlation matrix 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Entry (1, 0) 1.00            
(2) Total asset   0.01 1.00           
(3) Sales  0.01 0.96 1.00          
(4) Profit 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 1.00         
(5) Age -0.01 0.30 0.28 -0.01 1.00        
(6) Scope  -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.37 1.00       
(7) Member firms -0.00 -0.00 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.50 1.00      
(8) Industry size 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.01 1.00     
(9) Industry growth rate 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.19 1.00    
(10) GDP growth 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.00 0.03 1.00   
(11) Related presence (1, 0) 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.00 1.00  
(12) Impact 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 
(p < 0.05 for |r|  > 0.02)             
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TABLE 4. Models and hypothesis tests for H1-H3 
 
DV= Entry (1, 0)   (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Logit (5) Logit (6) Multilevel (7) Firth 
RELATEDNESS (H1)    0.66*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 
     [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
IMPACT (H2)     0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
      [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
RELATEDNESS*IMPACT (H3)     -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
       [0.36] [0.44] [0.55] 
Total Assets  0.11  0.09 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.16* 
   [0.43]  [0.53] [0.42] [0.42] [0.57] [0.09] 
Sales    0.16      
    [0.14]      
Profit   0.60 0.38 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.90 0.06 
   [0.52] [0.46] [0.48] [0.52] [0.52] [0.38] [0.71] 
Scope   -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
   [0.85] [0.89] [0.59] [0.64] [0.63] [0.45] [0.68] 
Number of member firms -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
   [0.85] [0.80] [0.83] [0.88] [0.90] [0.88] [0.90] 
Industry size  0.65*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Industry growth  -0.12 -0.10 -0.17 -0.23 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 
   [0.94] [0.957] [0.92] [0.90] [0.93] [0.93] [0.94] 
GDP growth  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   [0.25] [0.25] [0.24] [0.27] [0.27] [0.30] [0.30] 
Number of observations 14,344 14,344 14,344 14,344 14,344 14,344 14,344 
Wald chi-square  85.61 85.20 108.20 142.87 140.36 69.92 70.80 
P-value   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log-likelihood  -596.34 -595.61 -591.42 -586.02 -585.81 -584.57 -577.42 
Log-likelihood ratio test     4.92*** 5.40*** 0.21***     
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels for two-tailed tests.     
Inside brackets are robust standard errors clustered at the business group level.     
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TABLE 5. Industry presence of business groups 
 
DV= Presence (1, 0)   1999 All Years 
Relatedness  1.46*** 1.67*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] 
Impact   0.04*** 0.03*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] 
Total Asset  0.24*** 0.26*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] 
Profit   -1.17** 0.06*** 
   [0.04] [0.00] 
Scope   0.07*** 0.07*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] 
Number of member firms 0.01 -0.00** 
   [0.22] [0.03] 
Industry size  0.00*** 0.00*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] 
Industry growth  -3.15** -0.37 
   [0.05] [0.55] 
GDP growth   0.00 
    [0.67] 
Observations   1,155 18,326 
Log-likelihood   -462.47 -7483.39 
** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels for two-tailed tests.  
Inside brackets are robust standard errors clustered at the business group level. 
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TABLE 6. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Definition Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Business group variables      
Business group size Logarithm of business group total assets 9.68 1.24 7.00 11.88 
Business group profitability Size-adjusted group-wide profit 0.09 0.52 -9.45 -0.80 
Business group diversity 
Size-adjusted count of industry sectors in business 
group 0.91 4.99 -15.00 10.97 
Number of member firms Size-adjusted count of member firms 2.60 11.95 -27.99 40.33 
Level of within-group 
transactions 
Percentage of within-group sales in total business 
group sales 18.99 10.82 1.50 40.80 
Business group age Years from founding 45.88 25.89 1.00 112.00 
      
Firm variables      
Firm size Logarithm of firm total assets 14.18 1.60 10.43 18.35 
Firm age Years from founding 34.77 15.28 1.00 75.00 
Firm profitability Logarithm of firm profitability 13.88 0.59 0.00 16.35 
R&D intensity Logged proportion of R&D spending in sales 0.58 0.65 0.00 3.85 
Firm scope Count of industries in firm 3.04 2.29 1.00 14.00 
      
Industry variables      
Industry size  Logged total production value of industry 16.59 1.08 13.49 18.70 
Industry growth rate Annual growth rate of sector 0.08 0.06 -0.16 0.47 
Strategic impact Number of related industry sectors 9.75 13.56 0.00 75.00 
Relatedness within firm Presence of related industry in firm portfolio (0, 1) 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Group member presence Presence of group member in the focal industry (0, 1) 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
      
Year variable      
GDP growth South Korean annual GDP growth rate 5.45 4.37 -5.70 15.70 
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TABLE 7. Correlations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Firm entry (1, 0) 1.00                  
(2) Business group size  0.00 1.00                 
(3) Business group profit 0.00 0.24 1.00                
(4) Business group diversity 0.00 0.09 0.16 1.00               
(5) Number of member firms 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.55 1.00              
(6) Within-group transactions -0.02 0.59 0.28 0.17 0.24 1.00             
(7) Business group age 0.00 0.35 0.09 0.43 0.06 0.00 1.00            
(8) Firm size 0.00 0.35 0.06 -0.13 -0.13 0.14 0.16 1.00           
(9) Firm age 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 0.17 0.38 1.00          
(10) Firm profitability 0.00 0.16 0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.37 0.12 1.00         
(11) Firm R&D intensity 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.28 0.16 0.21 -0.12 0.14 1.00        
(12) Firm scope 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.13 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.12 0.11 1.00       
(13) Industry size 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 1.00      
(14) Industry growth 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 1.00     
(15) Industry strategic impact 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.09 1.00    
(16) Firm presence in related industry 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.02 -0.02 0.00 1.00   
(17) Group presence in industry 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.05 0.28 0.15 1.00  
(18) GDP growth -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 
( p < 0.05 for |r| > 0.01)                   
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TABLE 8. Models and hypothesis tests for H4-H7 
 
 
DV= Firm entry (1, 0)   (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Logit (5) Logit (6) Logit (7) Multilevel (8) Firth 
GROUP SIZE (H4a)   0.04 -0.12 -0.09 -0.42* -0.16 0.11 -0.15 
    [0.83] [0.54] [0.66] [0.05] [0.57] [0.71] [0.45] 
GROUP DIVERSITY (H5)   -0.17** -0.16** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.24*** 
     [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
FIRM OPERATING IN RELATED SECTOR (H6a)   1.97*** 1.48*** 1.42*** 1.46*** 1.40*** 
      [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
GROUP PRESENCE IN SECTOR 
(H6b)     5.84*** 5.84*** 5.79*** 5.42*** 
       [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
INTERDEPENDENCE (H7)      -0.05** -0.08** -0.04* 
        [0.02] [0.01] [0.05] 
Firm age   -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 
Firm size   -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 
   [0.54] [0.54] [0.63] [0.68] [0.47] [0.63] [0.40] [0.63] 
Firm liquidity  0.17 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.09 
   [0.34] [0.37] [0.56] [0.58] [0.52] [0.66] [0.59] [0.54] 
Firm profitability  0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.15 
   [0.97] [0.99] [0.83] [0.72] [0.76] [0.83] [0.87] [0.15] 
Firm R&D intensity  -0.28 -0.28 -0.12 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.25 0.01 
   [0.44] [0.42] [0.72] [0.62] [0.82] [0.98] [0.48] [0.96] 
Firm scope  0.44*** 0.45*** 0.54*** 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.50*** 0.65*** 0.50*** 
   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Business group age  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
   [0.77] [0.87] [0.21] [0.32] [0.27] [0.58] [0.71] [0.50] 
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TABLE 8. Continued 
 
 
DV= Firm entry (1, 0)   (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Logit (5) Logit (6) Logit (7) Multilevel (8) Firth 
Number of member firms 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04* 0.03 0.04 
   [0.91] [0.91] [0.09] [0.12] [0.11] [0.05] [0.10] [0.00] 
Group-wide profit  -0.20 -0.22 -0.18 -0.18 -0.16 0.09 0.34 -0.29 
   [0.13] [0.11] [0.20] [0.19] [0.23] [0.87] [0.81] [0.07] 
Industry size  0.41** 0.41** 0.34** 0.39** -0.14 -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 
   [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.02] [0.52] [0.63] [0.75] [0.50] 
Industry strategic impact 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.75] [0.84] [0.88] [0.78] 
Industry growth  -1.14 -1.15 -0.74 -0.76 -0.85 -0.91 -1.13 -0.92 
   [0.54] [0.53] [0.68] [0.68] [0.68] [0.65] [0.64] [0.70] 
GDP growth  -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
   [0.50] [0.49] [0.44] [0.41] [0.43] [0.48] [0.42] [0.19] 
Observations   59,753 59,753 59,753 59,753 59,753 56,905 56,905 56,905 
Log-likelihood  -414.62 -414.58 -405.54 -385.08 -302.96 -298.79 -291.28 -250.01 
Model improvement (BIC’ difference)   10.92 -7.07 -29.92 -153.24 -7.55     
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels for two-tailed tests.  
Inside brackets are robust standard errors clustered at the business group level. 
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TABLE 9.  Summary of empirical test results 
 
Hypothesis Expected sign 
Sign of 
coefficient 
Statistical 
support 
H1. A business group is more likely to enter an industry if the business group participates in 
a related industry. 
+ + supported 
H2.  The more linkages to other industries an industry has, the more likely it is for a business 
group to make a new entry into that industry. 
+ + supported 
H3.  The positive relationship between the number of industry linkages of an industry and a 
business group’s likelihood of a new entry is weakened when the business group participates 
in an industry related to the target industry. 
- - not supported 
H4a. The larger the size of the business group, the more likely is a member firm to enter an 
industry new to the firm. 
+ - not supported 
H4b. The relative size of a business group member moderates the positive relationship 
between the size of a business group and the member’s new industry entry such that the 
larger the member’s size, the weaker is the relationship. 
  not supported 
H5. The more diversified is a business group, the less likely it is for a member firm to enter 
an industry new to the firm. 
- - supported 
H6a. A business group member firm is more likely to enter a new industry that is related to 
the firm’s existing industry portfolio. 
+ + supported 
H6b. A business group member firm is more likely to enter a new industry in which other 
member firms already operate. 
+ + supported 
H7. The higher the overall level of transactions within a business group, the less likely is a 
member firm to enter an industry new to the firm. 
- - supported 
 
